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Counter-Restitution for Monetary Remedies
in Equity
George P. Roach∗
Abstract
Equitable remedies are growing in importance as the remedies of
choice for intellectual property and federal agency claims. The measure of
monetary remedies in equity is founded in trust law, which provides that
even a disloyal trustee is entitled to indemnity for expenses that benefit the
trust. Based on this principle and case law on measuring intellectual
property remedies, a defendant to a claim for a monetary remedy in equity
has the opportunity to prove that the unjust enrichment established by the
plaintiff should be reduced for unrelated revenues or beneficial expenses.
Opponents of this right justify revenue disgorgement by the prejudicial
nature of the defendant’s actions; an inexplicable distinction between
"restitution" and "disgorgement"; and the disputed authority of a court in
equity to exact punitive remedies. The right to prove counter-restitution
represents the traditional law in equity and when federal agencies seek
gross disgorgement, they exceed the limited jurisdiction that the United
States Supreme Court allows for their ancillary claims to injunctive relief.
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I. Introduction
Within the North Texas legal community, the tale of one litigator’s
speech to a statewide American Medical Association convention is often
repeated with the understatement that makes Texas famous. Purportedly,
the lawyer’s keynote speech began by reminding the audience that in the
eighteenth century, lawyers were drafting the Declaration of Independence
and United States Constitution while doctors were still applying leeches or
otherwise bleeding their patients. On reflection, one wonders if a doctor
might now return the favor at an American Bar Association convention and
ask how well American lawyers have kept pace with the progress that
medicine has achieved in the last 200 years.
Monetary remedies in equity offer substantial promise for current and
future corporate litigation.
Variously known as restitution, unjust
enrichment or disgorgement, they are measured similarly for intentional or
conscious unjust acts, as they are all based on an accounting in equity.
They are conceptually simple, largely based on ex post data (as opposed to
ex ante projections) and can reduce the discovery burden on the plaintiff.
Monetary remedies in equity sometimes offer a "charming" result1 or more
complete relief2 for claims such as the misappropriation of intangible
1. See Andrew Kull, Restitution’s Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17, 32 (2003)
(stating that "as retributive justice it has an unmistakable charm").
2. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 437 (Jairus W. Perry ed., 12th ed. 1877) ("We
have gone over the principal grounds upon which Courts of Equity grant relief in matters of
accident, mistake and fraud."). Story further stated, "The relief . . . is more complete,
adequate, and perfect, inasmuch as it adapts itself to the special circumstances of each
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property because many states still do not recognize a claim for conversion
of intangible property.3 For some causes in action, equitable remedies may
therefore provide the only real choice relating to intangible assets, like
domain names,4 negative information (i.e., information on unsuccessful or
failed experiments),5 computer files,6 confidential information,7 and such
exotics as DNA patterns or virtual assets.8 Apparently, remedies in equity
also offer advantages to Congress, which has shown a marked preference
for enacting vague references to injunctive relief and other equitable
remedies to support or enforce federal agency mandates.9
With such a view of the future, it seems contradictory to emphasize the
need to improve our understanding of the historical development of existing
monetary remedies in equity. Even though counter-restitution is an
essential element of these remedies, its origins and links to trust and agency
law are either forgotten or overlooked. This Article will show that the
plaintiff’s counter-restitution,10 offsetting credit for revenue apportionment
and the defendant’s beneficial expenses, is an essential consideration to

particular case; adjusting all cross equities; and bringing all the parties in interest before the
court so as to prevent multiplicity of suits and interminable litigation." Id.
3. See, e.g., Emke v. Compana, L.L.C., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70826, at *9 (N.D.
Tex. 2007) (stating that, in Texas, the law precludes any conversion claim unless it concerns
physical property).
4. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1029–30 (9th Cir. 2003) (ruling that an
internet domain name is intangible property that could serve as the basis for a conversion
claim); Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1037–39 (9th Cir. 2003) (asking the California
Supreme Court whether an internet domain name is property that can be converted under
California tort law).
5. See Bourns, Inc. v. Raychem Corp., 331 F.3d 704, 709–10 (9th Cir. 2003)
(providing an example of an unjust enrichment case concerning negative information).
6. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006) ("Any person
who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil
action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other
equitable relief.").
7. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27–28 (1987) (characterizing breach
of the common law duty to protect employer’s confidential information as unjust
enrichment).
8. Virtual assets are prizes, distinctions, or assets found in on-line games or artificial
environments. See generally Andrea Vanina Arias, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Swords
and Armor: Regulating the Theft of Virtual Goods, 57 EMORY L.J. 1301 (2008).
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. c
(2011) (stating that one of the questions courts must answer is whether a particular remedy is
available under a statute authorizing "equitable relief").
10. While counter-restitution is also a significant issue in relation to in-kind rescission
and specific restitution, these facets of the topic are not addressed directly in the Article.
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measure the defendant’s unjust enrichment.11 The Restatement (First) of
Restitution12 (First Restatement) and Restatement (Third) of Restitution &
Unjust Enrichment13 (Third Restatement) address the issue of counterrestitution by name as a part of its discussion of rescission and by substance
in other sections, but neither Restatement clearly states that the defendant in
equity has a right to try to prove that the unjust enrichment to the defendant
evidenced by the plaintiff should be adjusted. This Article presents
sufficient support from existing case law to recognize that existing practice
justifies such a right with limited exceptions and conditions.
The Restatements’ rationale and standards for measuring counterrestitution are unclear and at times contradictory. United States Supreme
Court opinions handed down in the development of patent and copyright
law in the nineteenth century show that counter-restitution should be
considered from the construct of deeming the defendant a "quasi-trustee."
Similarly, the quasi-trustee standard applied trust law’s indemnity standard
to measure counter-restitution.14 This Article will show that, while the
Restatements do not generally ignore the influence of trust or agency law
on the law of restitution, they generally appear reluctant to apply the
indemnity standard in the analysis and measure of unjust enrichment and
counter-restitution. The indemnity standard of evaluating trustee expenses
by their benefit to the trust (even for unauthorized expenses) is not applied
widely in the First Restatement or Third Restatement.
11. The issue of establishing apportionment is sufficiently important to warrant
consideration, but it will not be included in this analysis. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) ("The purpose is to provide just compensation for
the wrong, not to impose a penalty by giving to the copyright proprietor profits which are
not attributable to the infringement."); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. &
Mfg. Co., 225 U.S. 604, 615–16 (1912) (stating the general proposition that "the plaintiff
must prove its case and carry the burden imposed by law upon every person seeking to
recover money or property from another"); Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884)
(stating that the plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence of damages suffered, and the
Court awarded only nominal damages); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 42 cmt. b (2011) ("There is no unjust enrichment (and no claim by the rule of
§ 42) unless the defendant has obtained a benefit in violation of the claimant’s right to
exclude others from the interests in question."). See generally Caprice L. Roberts, The Case
for Restitution and Unjust Enrichment Remedies in Patent Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
653 (2010).
12. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION (1937).
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011).
14. See Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 148 (1881) (stating that
court of equity will administer relief by awarding compensation computed and measured by
the same rule that courts of equity apply to the case of a trustee who has wrongfully used the
trust property for his own advantage).
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The last section of the Article analyzes gross disgorgement remedies
(monetary remedies without allowance for counter-restitution) awarded in
federal agency case law, especially claims by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA), that will
offer a challenge for the general applicability and relevance of the
Restatements. The Supreme Court has now repeatedly held that remedies
in equity must be limited to traditional remedies and designated the
Restatements authoritative guides for distinguishing traditional remedies in
equity.15 Seemingly, many of the agency opinions conflict with the
Restatements and the Supreme Court with impunity. The awards to the
FTC and the FDA of gross disgorgement do not resemble traditional
monetary remedies in equity in other areas of the law or even for other
federal agencies. The Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit established that no federal court has the jurisdiction to make
such awards.16
II. Anti-Netting Doctrine as a Genetic Marker for Monetary Remedies
in Equity
The anti-netting doctrine, which is used to measure unjust enrichment,
has three characteristics that highlight some key points in this Article. First,
it reveals the breadth of corporate or business litigation influenced by
monetary remedies in equity.17 Second, it is generally applied without any
acknowledgement of its origin or rationale.18 Third, it exemplifies the
influence of trust law on the law of restitution and shows how remedies in

15. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217
(2002) ("Rarely will there be need for any more ‘antiquarian inquiry’ . . . than consulting, as
we have done, standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements,
which make the answer clear.").
16. See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S 356, 362 (2006) (stating that
not all relief under restitution is permitted in equity); Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999) (discussing the powers of federal courts
under the Judiciary Act’s grant of jurisdiction over "all . . . suits in equity"); Sec. Exch.
Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117–20 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing whether
disgorgement as a remedy survives Grupo as a remedy available at chancery in 1789).
17. See George P. Roach, Counting the Beans: Unjust Enrichment and the
Defendant’s Overhead, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 483, 523–26 (2008) (discussing the antinetting doctrine).
18. Id.
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equity can be measured more appropriately once the rationale is
determined.19
It is otherwise unknown in the measure of corporate damages for a
plaintiff to be allowed to choose which results to include in the remedy.
Under the anti-netting doctrine, separate infringements that produce
negative results need not be accumulated with the profits of the infringer in
the measure of the defendant’s unjust enrichment. The interpretation of this
anti-netting rule can have a large impact on a monetary award, especially in
cases relating to trading operations for stocks and commodities. In a case
from the Carter Administration, the difference in unjust enrichment
between applying the rule or not resulted in a difference of more than $500
million in claims made to enforce the pricing differential between old oil
and new oil.20
This obscure doctrine has been applied in opinions relating to fiduciary
claims,21 patents,22 copyrights,23 trademarks,24 trade secrets,25 and federal
agency claims.26 The doctrine, therefore, manifests the commonality of
measuring unjust enrichment across a wide range of substantive law.
Technically, the plaintiff is entitled to deem each infringing unit of
production as a separate transaction.27 The doctrine has been applied to

19. Id.
20. United States v. Sutton, 795 F.2d 1040, 1062–63 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1986).
21. See King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 91 (1869).
22. See Crosby Steam-Gage & Valve Co. v. Consol. Safety Valve Co., 141 U.S. 441,
457 (1891).
23. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 54–55 (2d Cir. 1939),
aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
24. See, e.g., Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc. v. Pro-Tech Power Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 834,
856 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("Given that the calculations of damages rests on equitable
considerations, the Court will not allow Pro-Tech to offset the profits it made in 1995, 1995
[sic], 1997, and 1998 by its losses in 1993 and 1996.").
25. See Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. Am. Mktg. Corp., 139 A.2d 281, 286 (N.J. 1958).
26. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs., Inc., 574 F.2d 90,
102 (2d Cir. 1978).
27. See Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 458 (1936),
superseded by statute, Act of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-587, 60 Stat. 778 ("The owner of
the patent, in holding the infringers to an accounting, is not confined to all or nothing. There
may be an acceptance of transactions resulting in a gain with a rejection of transactions
resulting in a loss.").
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segregate the defendant’s losses as distinguished by year,28 individual retail
outlet,29 and separate or experimental product lines.30
Most explanations for this doctrine fail to explain why the plaintiff
should be allowed such discretion: "The owner of the patent, in holding the
infringers to an accounting, is not confined to all or nothing. There may be
an acceptance of transactions resulting in a gain with a rejection of
transactions resulting in a loss."31 Even though the courts have repeatedly
restricted a defendant’s ability to offset the loss of one independent
infringement with the profit of a separate infringement, none have cited any
fundamental rationale other than the fact that the plaintiff and defendant are
not partners.32
Only one such case actually cited Section 213 of the Restatement of
Trusts,33 which offers the missing explanation: The doctrine comes from
claims against an agent for unauthorized investments.34 The principal is
entitled to the greater of the principle invested or the investment’s market
value for each individual investment, not for the group of investments as a
whole.35 An authority on trust law, Professor Charles Rounds explains the
doctrine as follows:
28. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing profits and losses on an
annual basis).
29. Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 54–55; Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 781–82
(11th Cir. 1988).
30. Jones Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Steinman, 466 F. Supp. 560, 563 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
31. Duplate Corp., 298 U.S. at 458; see also Burger King Corp., 855 F.2d at 781 ("An
accounting for profits has been determined by this Court to further the congressional purpose
by making infringement unprofitable, and is justified because it deprives the defendant of
unjust enrichment and provides a deterrent to similar activity in the future."); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS § 37 cmt. d (1995) (discussing
recoverable profits).
32. See, e.g., Crosby Steam Gage & Valve Co. v. Consol. Safety Valve Co., 141 U.S.
441, 451 (1891); Duplate Corp., 298 U.S. at 458. But see Sutton, 795 F.2d at 1062; Burger
King Corp., 855 F.2d at 781–82 (stating that holdover franchisee could not set off losses
from some restaurants against profits from others, but was permitted to offset one year’s
losses against another year’s gains from the same restaurant); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 cmt. d. (1995) (discussing recoverable profits).
33. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Commonwealth Chem. Secs., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d
Cir. 1978).
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 213 (1992) ("A trustee who is liable for a
loss caused by a breach of trust may not reduce the amount of the liability by deducting the
amount of a profit that accrued through another and distinct breach of trust . . . .").
35. See King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 91 (1869) ("The rule is perfectly well settled, that
a cestui que trust is at liberty to elect to approve an unauthorized investment, and enjoy its
profits, or to reject it at his option . . . .").
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If the breaches of trust, however, are not separate and distinct, the
trustee is accountable only for the net gain or chargeable only with the
net loss resulting therefrom. Without the anti-netting rule, a trustee
under certain circumstances might be inclined to commit multiple
breaches of trust: "For example, the trustee whose misconduct has
caused a loss may take improper risks in pursuit of extra profits if those
profits may serve to eliminate or reduce the amount of expected
surcharge."36

Given this clarification (i.e., that courts in equity want to discourage
trustees from risking the principal’s assets to erase the trustee’s losses), the
doctrine may have less applicability than initially indicated by the
observation that the plaintiff and defendant are not partners. The doctrine
may be less applicable to cases in which the separate infringements occur
simultaneously and therefore do not lend themselves to sequential risk. The
Third Restatement states the rule correctly and offers supporting citations
without referring to Section 213 of the Restatement of Trusts.37
Despite the common heritage of monetary remedies in fiduciary,
intellectual property (IP) and federal agency law, little attention is given to
such commonality in measurement. Some mention is made of the
compatibility of measuring remedies in IP, but little between securities and
IP claims.38 At a minimum, a greater acknowledgement of commonality
would improve our understanding of the underlying rationale.

36. Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Relief for IP Rights Infringement is Primarily Equitable:
How American Legal Education Is Short-Changing the 21st Century Corporate Litigator, 26
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 313, 350 (2010) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 213 (1990)).
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. j
(2011) ("Profits and losses on the wrongdoer’s investments will be treated separately so long
as the transaction may be distinguished, so the threshold questions—is this one transaction
or a series of separate transactions?—is likely to be ‘outcome determinative.’");
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: FOLLOWING PROPERTY INTO ITS PRODUCT § 202
cmt. i (1937) (addressing successive transactions); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE
TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 865 (rev. 2d ed. 1995) (discussing
the use of equitable liens on the trust res or its substitute, which is the product of the
trustee’s wrongful conduct); 5 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 508
(William Franklin Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1989) (stating that, with respect to conscious
wrongdoers, beneficiaries can enforce an equitable lien upon the trust res or its substitute to
secure their claim against the trustee for damages arising from a breach of trust).
38. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Thomas James Assocs., 738 F. Supp. 88, 95
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Even where Congress has expressly provided a disgorgement remedy in
a statutory context, as in the area of trademark infringement, it has provided that a violator is
entitled to set off all proven costs or deductions against the profits accruing from his
violation.").
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III. Monetary Remedies in Nineteenth Century IP Case Opinions
Congress passed several significant statutes in the nineteenth century
regarding patents, copyrights and design patents, but none specified how
the defendant’s unjust enrichment should be measured. Congress enacted
statutory jurisdiction for injunctive relief39 and relied on the traditional
operation of an accounting in equity to measure monetary remedies.40 In
the twentieth century, Congress passed additional statutes that provided
further clarification, but they did not alter the actual measure of revenues
and expenses.41 The few statutory provisions that peripherally addressed
measurement issues largely codified the existing practice in the nineteenth
century. However, Congress overruled the common law in 194642 by
withdrawing unjust enrichment as a remedy for violations of utility patents,
and Congress reversed Garretson v. Clark43 as that opinion related to
design patents.44 Therefore, the measure of unjust enrichment for claims
regarding patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets is derived
almost exclusively from traditional principles for accounting in equity.45
39. See Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 193 (1881) ("‘[The Patent
Act of July 4, 1836] does not enlarge or alter the powers of the court over the subject matter
of the bill or the cause of action. It only extends its jurisdiction to parties not before falling
within it.’") (citations omitted); see also Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. 447, 454 (1854)
("[L]ooking to the act of congress applicable to this subject-matter, it appears that the rights
claimed by this bill are expressly conferred by way of forfeiture.").
40. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) ("Prior
to the Copyright Act of 1909 . . . there had been no statutory provision for the recovery of
profits, but that recovery had been allowed in equity both in copyright and patent cases as
appropriate equitable relief incident to a decree for an injunction.") (citations omitted);
1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 2.7, at 87–88 (1978) ("Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in the 19th century established that in a suit in equity for
infringement of patent or copyright, the patent or copyright holder was entitled to recover
the profits made through the infringement."). Palmer further stated, "Although the Court
sometimes explained this as a method for measuring the plaintiff’s damages, it was clear that
the relief was based on unjust enrichment, as the Court later recognized. In the cases during
this earlier period, recovery of profits could be obtained only in equity . . . ." Id.
41. See generally Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)
superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976);
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
42. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964).
43. See Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121–23 (1884) (affirming the lower court’s
reward of nominal damages).
44. See Nike Inc. v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(stating that Congress reported that "it now appears that the design patent laws provide no
effectual money recovery for infringement").
45. See Sammons v. Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 346 (1st Cir. 1942)
("Accountability of an infringer for profits was enforced in equity, both in patent and
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IV. Semantics

"The terminology of restitution is abstruse and confusing and is no matter
for amateurs."46

There is broad agreement among many of the leading authors of articles
on restitution that this discipline is not understood well by practitioners or
jurists, as the number of "professionals" is very limited.47 Professor Andrew
Kull, the Reporter for the Third Restatement, suggests that part of the
confusion may lie with some of the key terms.48 "Restitution" may have been
a poor choice for the First Restatement as it is commonly associated with
compensating damages.49 The authors of the First Restatement tried to
introduce the term "restitution" with a revised meaning, but the term’s
flexibility led to substantial confusion.50 By renaming the Third Restatement
to include both restitution and unjust enrichment, the authors manifest their
belief that the two terms are synonymous. Now the authors of the Third
Restatement offer another synonym—disgorgement. It should be understood
copyright cases, on the same equitable principles, even before the patent and copyright laws
specifically authorized this relief."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION &
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 (2011) (describing a restitution claim based on unauthorized
interference with recognized forms of intellectual property).
46. 1 DAN DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES § 4.1(2), at 556
(2d ed. 1993).
47. See Colleen Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 S.M.U. L. REV.
1577, 1581 (2002) ("The general law of restitution is for many an obscure subject, perhaps
explaining why so much confusion exists as to when monetary remedies are properly
characterized as restitutionary."); see also Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL.
L. REV. 1191, 1191–92 (1995) ("The linguistic confusion that bedevils the law of
restitution—necessitating laborious definitions before anyone can understand what you are
talking about—affords an early indication that the common name of this neglected body was
significantly ill-chosen."); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67
TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1277 (1989) ("Despite its importance, restitution is a relatively neglected
and underdeveloped part of the law."); Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the
Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 892
(1999) ("Restitution is becoming a lost art . . . .").
48. See Kull, supra note 47, at 1195 (discussing the "persistent uncertainty" associated
with the law of restitution).
49. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 cmt. e(2)
(2011) ("It is a natural use of the language to speak of requiring a criminal to ‘make
restitution’; the problem is that the liability imposed in such cases is not based primarily on
unjust enrichment, but on compensation for harm.").
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. c
(2011) ("As posed today in American courts, the question whether restitution is legal or
equitable is essentially artificial. . . . The likely explanation lies first in the protean character
of the word ‘restitution.’ . . . Second is the attenuated association of ideas that runs from
‘restitution’ through ‘unjust enrichment’ to ‘equity.’").
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that by equating disgorgement to an accounting in equity,51 the authors intend
all three terms to be largely synonymous and measured as an accounting for
defendants with wrongful intent. At present, there is substantial confusion in
federal agency case law between the three terms, as unjust enrichment and
restitution are sometimes distinguished from disgorgement, which is held to
preclude counter-restitution as a matter of law.52 For the purposes of this
Article, the term "gross disgorgement" is intended to refer to the measure of
unjust enrichment without offsets for counter-restitution as a matter of law.
Similarly, the Article will refer to disgorgement by "default" to include cases
in which the defendant is awarded no counter-restitution because she failed to
establish sufficient evidence or the defendant’s unjust acts were held as
contempt.
A. Profit vs. Advantage
The distinction between the objectives of disgorging the defendant’s
profit or the defendant’s advantage might seem slight but it has been
magnified to justify two opposing views of measuring unjust enrichment or
restitution. Advocates of the full-absorption approach to measuring
restitution—principally, the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits53—assert that
because the goal is to measure the defendant’s profits, such a measure should
deduct allocated overhead and other fixed costs from the defendant’s
revenues to conform with the normal accounting definition of profit.
51. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 116 n.24 (2d Cir. 2006)
("The history of the use of ‘disgorgement’ to mean the giving up of wrongly-gotten assets is
uncertain. Although the Oxford English Dictionary traces such use to 1837 . . . in 1974 it
‘appeared to be a term of modern vintage’ in legal contexts to one federal court." (citations
omitted)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. a (2011)
(stating that restitution measured by the defendant’s wrongful gain is frequently called
"disgorgement," or an "accounting," or an "accounting for profits").
52. See infra Section IX (discussing both Federal Trade Commission and Food and
Drug Administration claims for gross disgorgement).
53. See Hamill Am., Inc. v. GFI, Inc., 193 F.3d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[W]e have
assumed that general overhead expenses were deductible and reviewed only the sufficiency
of the nexus between the expense and the infringing product and/or adequacy of the adduced
formula for allocating overhead costs to the production of the infringing product."); Frank
Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 515 (9th Cir. 1985) ("A portion
of an infringer’s overhead properly may be deducted from gross revenues to arrive at profits,
at least where the infringement was not willful, conscious, or deliberate."); Sammons v.
Colonial Press, Inc., 126 F.2d 341, 348 (1st Cir. 1942) ("[T]he cases seem to assume,
without much discussion, that the infringer is entitled to a deduction of that portion of the
overhead expense properly allocable to the particular job.").
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Supporters of the incremental income approach—principally, the Fifth,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits54—advocate excluding fixed costs in the
measure of counter-restitution to ensure that the defendant is denied any
incentive to pursue her unjust actions.55
The 1872 Supreme Court opinion in Mowry v. Whitney56 focused less on
the defendant’s literal profits and more broadly on the defendant’s fruits of
the advantage gained:
The question to be determined in this case is, what advantage did the
defendant derive from using the complainant’s invention over what he had
in using other processes then open to the public and adequate to enable
him to obtain an equally beneficial result. The fruits of that advantage are
his profits. . . . That advantage is the measure of profits.57

This phrase has been widely repeated and cited.58 The Supreme Court
highlighted the same concept in 1940.59 The focus on the defendant’s
54. See Abbott Labs. v. Unlimited Beverages, Inc., 218 F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir.
2000) (stating that a court can award the defendant’s profits to the plaintiff under the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)); Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983)
("By preventing infringers from obtaining any net profit it makes any would-be infringer
negotiate directly with the owner of a copyright that he wants to use, rather than bypass the
market by stealing the copyright and forcing the owner to seek compensation from the courts
for his loss."); Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co. Inc., 613 F.2d 582, 585 (5th Cir. 1980)
("[W]e find the district court properly ordered [the defendant] to account the plaintiffs for
the profits it earned from its willful infringement. This accounting serves two purposes:
[R]emedying unjust enrichment and deterring future infringement.").
55. Financial incentives are deemed significant if the defendant’s activities are
allowed to absorb fixed costs. For a detailed discussion of the case law that supports the full
absorption or incremental cost approaches, see Roach, supra note 17.
56. See Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 620, 648–53 (1871) (holding that the charge of
the infringement against the defendant is sustained, but the defendant is not liable to the
plaintiff for interest on profits).
57. Id. at 651.
58. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400 (1940)
("The profits, therefore, which [the defendant] must account for, are . . . the fruits of the
advantage which he derived from the use of that invention . . . ."); Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S.
565, 583 (1895); Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139, 147 (1894); Sessions v.
Romadka, 145 U.S. 29, 45 (1892); Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 197–
98 (1881); Mfg. Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253, 255 (1881); Littlefield v. Perry, 88 U.S. 205,
228 (1874); Swan Carburetor Co. v. Nash Motors Co., 133 F.2d 562, 565 (4th Cir. 1943);
Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1938); Dunkley Co. v.
Cent. Cal. Canneries, 7 F.2d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 1925); Van Kannel Revolving Door Co. v.
Uhrich, 297 F. 363, 368 (8th Cir. 1924); Phila. Rubber Works Co. v. U.S. Rubber
Reclaiming Works, 277 F. 171, 176 (2d Cir. 1921); Cambria Iron Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co.,
224 F. 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1915); Wales v. Waterbury Mfg. Co., 101 F. 126, 129 (2d Cir.
1900); Bus. Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1213, 1238
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 887 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1989); Van Brunt v. La
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advantage, as distinguished from profit, evolved from two influences. First,
there exists case law for claims against a trustee that addressed enrichment
as "the fruit of the advantage" before the Supreme Court used the phrase in
1872.60 It seems unlikely that Justice Strong’s opinion in Mowry borrowed
the term from a Delaware fraud case61 or a Mississippi fiduciary case;62 it
seems more likely that the three cases borrowed the term from a common
source presently unknown.
The second influence is from claims for negative enrichment,
recognized by American courts as distinguished from British courts, which
do not recognize such claims even today.63 The Supreme Court faced a
series of cases addressing liability for patent infringement against a
defendant whose operations were unprofitable. The Court held that the
defendant is enriched if the plaintiff can show that the defendant’s losses
would have been greater without the infringement, reflecting the "but-for"
standard of causation and apportionment. The fruit of the advantage was

Crosse Plow Co., 208 F. 281, 287 (W.D. Wis. 1913), aff’d, 220 F. 626 (7th Cir. 1915).
59. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400 (1940); see also
Carter Prods., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383, 408 (D. Md. 1963)
(discussing the comparison between "advantages" and "profits"); Gotham Silk Hosiery Co.
v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 344, 345–46 (D. Del. 1940) ("In settling an
accounting between a patentee and an infringer of the patent, the question is: [N]ot what
profits the latter has made in his business, or from his manner of conducting it, but what
advantage has he derived from his use of the patented invention?" (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.
v. Turrill (In re Cawood Patent), 94 U.S. 695, 696 (1877), aff’d, 110 U.S. 301 (1884))).
60. See Miller v. Baynard, 7 Del. 559, 567–68 (Del. Err. & App. 1863) ("[I]s it right to
permit [the defendant], either at law or equity, to avail himself of the fruits of an advantage
obtained by artifice or deception?"); Winn v. Dillon, 27 Miss. 494, 497 (Miss. Err. & App.
1854) ("[T]he well-established principles of equity prevent a party from reaping the fruits of
such an advantage, and declare that the property so acquired must be held in trust for the
benefit of the party justly entitled to it.").
61. Miller, 7 Del. at 567–68.
62. Winn, 27 Miss. at 497.
63. The British definition of unjust enrichment has not included the notion of
"negative unjust enrichment." Consider the case of Celaneses Int’l Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd.,
[1999] RPC 203 (Ch. D. 1998), relating to the infringement of a patent on acetic acid. Two
operations of the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s patent. Id. at 203. The judge held that
unjust enrichment could only be awarded from the profitable operation despite the fact that
both incurred savings as a result of the infringement. Id. at 204; see also Attorney Gen. v.
Blake, [2001] 1 AC (HL(E)) 284 (discussing whether an account for profits can be given as
a remedy for breach of contract); JAMES EDELMAN, GAIN-BASED DAMAGES: CONTRACT
TORT, EQUITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 74–76 (2002) (discussing disgorgement
damages when no profit is made, but expense is saved).
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defined as an improvement in the defendant’s profits or savings, not the
profits themselves.64
Courts and legislators share the goal of denying any economic
incentive to infringe.65 For example, Congress explicitly stated that the
goal of the Lanham Act is to deny that incentive.66 Supporters of the
incremental cost approach assert that targeting the disgorgement of
advantage denies all incentives, including absorption of overhead.67
Advocates of the full absorption approach focus instead on disgorging
"profit," which they measure in a literal accounting sense.68 Their approach
argues that fixed overhead must be deducted from operating income to

64. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Turrill (In re Cawood Patent), 94 U.S. 695, 710 (1877),
aff’d, 110 U.S. 301 (1884) ("In settling an account between a patentee and an infringer of the
patent, the question is, not what profits the latter has made in his business, or from his
manner of conducting it, but what advantage has he derived from his use of the patented
invention."); see also Mfg. Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253, 255 (1882) ("The question to be
determined . . . is, what advantage did the defendant derive from using the complainant’s
invention over what he had in using other processes then open to the public, and adequate to
enable him to obtain an equally beneficial result. The fruits of the advantage are his
profits."); DOBBS, supra note 46, § 4.5(2), at 632 n.6 ("If the defendant has realized savings
or will more likely than not realize savings . . . those savings can form the basis for figuring
restitution. The savings measure is not a market measure. To save an expense is to increase
a profit or surplus. . . . [T]his is a consequential restitution measure.").
65. See Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. 788, 804 (1870), superseded by
statute, Act of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-587, 60 Stat. 778, as recognized in Am. Med.
Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("The controlling consideration is
that he shall not profit by his wrong. A more favorable rule would offer a premium to
dishonesty and invite to aggression."); Dean v. Mason, 61 U.S. 198, 203 (1858) ("The rule in
such a case is, the amount of profits received by the unlawful use of the machines, as this, in
general, is the damage done to the owner of the patent."); Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann
Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that a restrictive approach to
accounting of profits does not meet the goals of the Lanham Act); Teaching Co. v. Unapix
Entm’t, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 567, 589 (E.D. Va. 2000) (discussing whether accounting of the
profits of a trademark infringer is proper); Dad’s Root Beer Co. v. Doc’s Beverages, Inc., 94
F. Supp. 121, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff’d, 193 F. Supp. 77 (2d Cir. 1951) (applying New
York law).
66. See Maier Brewing Co., 390 F.2d at 122 (stating that to accomplish the goals of
the Lanham Act, courts must make "acts of trade-mark infringement, or at the very least acts
of deliberate trade-mark piracy, unprofitable").
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. e
(2011) ("The object of the disgorgement remedy—to eliminate the possibility of profit from
conscious wrongdoing—is one of the cornerstones of the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment.").
68. See id. § 42 cmt. i ("By contrast, the result of excluding a deduction that is relevant
to the calculation of net profits—and for which the defendant will not otherwise be
reimbursed—is that the accounting for profits is made to encompass a punitive element.").
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conform to normal accounting practice.69 Critics of full absorption,
including the author of this Article, respond that there is no basis for
interjecting modern accounting practices into a traditional remedy.70 The
term "profit" was in general use well before the development of generally
accepted accounting principles.71
Second, measuring profit for
disgorgement has always been distinct from normal management
accounting, as it makes adjustments for the services of the defendant,
infringing expenses, and public policy concerns.
Third, the term
"advantage" implies the marginal benefit profit in excess of the defendant’s
"but-for" position.72
The Third Restatement fully reflects the split in federal circuits over
the two approaches: The full absorption approach is supported in Section
42 and the incremental cost approach in Section 51.73 The rationale of
Section 51 focuses on denying the incentive to infringe:
By contrast, the defendant will not be allowed to deduct expenses (such
as ordinary overhead) that would have been incurred in any event, if the
result would be that defendant’s wrongful activities—by defraying a
portion of overall expenses—yield an increased profit from defendant’s
operations as a whole.74

Section 42 concludes that the disgorgement of the defendant’s income
without a credit for allocated overhead would be punitive and must be
avoided.75 To an outsider of the Third Restatement, the contradiction in
principles may be further confused by the range of terms used to describe
the object of the measurement process. The Third Restatement speaks of

69. See id. § 51 cmt. e (providing how profits are accounted and discussing the
question of attribution).
70. See, e.g., Roach, supra note 17, at 587, 590 (criticizing the full-absorption
approach and supporting the incremental cost approach, and stating that the full-absorption
approach appears inconsistent with the primary purpose of the Third Restatement).
71. See, e.g., Mark 8:36 (King James) ("For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain
the whole world, and lose his own soul?"); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE
SHREW, act 1, sc. 1 ("No profit grows where is no pleasure ta’en: In brief, sir, study what
you most affect.").
72. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (discussing the "but-for" doctrine).
73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 cmt. d
(2011) (discussing damages and profits); id. § 51 cmt. e (citing uses of the "incremental
change method").
74. Id. § 51 cmt. h.
75. Compare id. § 51 cmt. e (providing a good example of the incremental approach),
with id. § 42 (providing a good example of the full absorption approach).
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disgorging profit, net profit, gain, net gain, benefit, etc.76 In Section IX, the
Article will show that federal agencies tend to exploit the ongoing
confusion over the distinctions between restitution, unjust enrichment,
disgorgement and terms that vary in meaning by claiming legal remedies as
remedies in equity.
V. Quasi-Trustee
Understanding the contributions of trust law to measuring unjust
enrichment in equity is important not only to provide a grounding in the
foundations of the remedy but also to appreciate the boundaries to the
measure. In a 1924 opinion on patent remedies, Judge Geiger, a federal
district judge in Wisconsin, suggested that the standard for awarding
indemnity to a trustee in default should be the minimum standard for
measuring counter-restitution for willful defendants’ unjust enrichment.77
Assuming that a patent infringer’s liability is analogous to that of a trustee
in default, he concluded that such a defendant should be treated no worse.78
The Third Restatement acknowledges a connection between the law of
trusts and the law of restitution and unjust enrichment.79 In particular, the
Third Restatement affirms Judge Geiger’s assumption that measuring unjust
enrichment for the misappropriation of intellectual property should be
measured no more severely than for a trustee in default: "Thus in the
context of intellectual property, the notion of treating the infringer as a
trustee under a duty to account has been codified in the remedial provisions
of the Copyright Act . . . ."80
The Supreme Court has held that while a defendant to a claim ancillary
to injunctive relief is not, in fact, a trustee to the plaintiff, the measure of
the defendant’s unjust enrichment greatly resembles that for a trustee in
default.81 The Court analyzed this similarity as it related to the issue of
76. See, e.g., id. § 42 (addressing how to account for profits, gains, and benefits); id.
§ 51 (instructing how to determine net profit).
77. See Christensen v. Nat’l Brake & Elec. Co., 10 F.2d 856, 861–62 (E.D. Wis. 1924)
(discussing the characterization of an infringer as a trustee ex maleficio).
78. See id. at 862 ("[I]t would be anomalous to withhold from an infringer, merely
because his liability is said to be analogous to that of a trustee ex maleficio, credits for
disbursements which . . . would have been unhesitatingly given him because the law
demands that he incur them as a matter of duty.").
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011).
80. Id. § 51 cmt. i.
81. See Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 214 (1881).
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jurisdiction for a patent claim.82 The specific issue concerned whether a
patent owner could seek monetary relief in equity after the patent expired.83
The Court held that while the defendant’s position was similar to that of a
defendant trustee, there was no fiduciary relationship.84 In the absence of a
legitimate claim for injunctive relief, the owner of an expired patent had no
jurisdiction in equity. However, the Court held in a different case that the
plaintiff’s remedy should be measured as if the defendant were a selfdealing trustee.85 This principle has been frequently repeated by key
opinions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including Sheldon.86

82. See id. ("The patentee, succeeding in establishing his right, is entitled to an
account of the profits realized by the infringer, and that the rule for ascertaining the amount
of such profits is that of treating the infringer as though he were a trustee for the patentee, in
respect to profits.").
83. Id.
84. See id. ("[I]t is nowhere said that the patentee’s right to an account is based upon
the idea that there is a fiduciary relation created between him and the wrong-doer by the fact
of infringement.").
85. See id.; see also Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 148 (1888), superseded by
statute, Act of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79587, 60 Stat. 778, as recognized in Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983) (stating that courts should award relief as
"measured by the same rule that courts of equity apply to the case of a trustee who has
wrongfully used the trust property for his own advantage").
86. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) (stating
that prior to a statutory provision, recovering profits had been allowed in equity as
appropriate relief "incident to a decree for an injunction"); L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Wm.
Wrigley, Jr., Co., 277 U.S. 97, 100 (1928) (stating that the defendant does not have to
account for materials and labor, but "it does not follow that [the defendant] should be
allowed what he paid for the chance to what he knew that he had no right to do"); HamiltonBrown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916) (requiring, through equity,
that a trademark infringer account for and yield gains to the true owner by analogy to a
trustee’s liability for profits acquired by wrongful use of trust property); Packet Co. v.
Sickles, 86 U.S. 611, 617–18 (1873) ("It is that of converting the infringer into a trustee for
the patentee as regards the profits thus made, and the adjustment of these profits is subject to
all the equitable considerations which are necessary to do complete justice between the
parties . . . ."); Georgia Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 517
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) ("[A] compensation computed and measured by the same rule that courts of
equity apply to the case of a trustee who has wrongfully used the trust property for his own
advantage."); Dad’s Root Beer Co. v. Doc’s Beverages, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 121, 122 (S.D.N.Y.
1950), aff’d, 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1951) (stating the rule governing federal trademark
infringement law); Triplex Safety Glass Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 38 F. Supp. 639,
642 (D. Del. 1941) ("The patent infringer is not a trustee and the trust analogy is merely used
as a measure of compensation."); see also Joel Eichengrun, Remedying the Remedy of
Accounting, 60 IND. L.J. 463, 484 (1985) ("[T]he reference to constructive trust may be read
as suggesting an analogy; just as the court will declare a wrongdoer to be a fictitious,
‘constructive’ trustee so, too, the court will impose the obligation to account on a wrongdoer
when it is appropriate . . . .").
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While the claim of a trustee in default for compensation for services is
problematic, the claim for indemnity for reasonable expenses by that same
trustee is more assured. Section 244 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts
provides that the trustee’s indemnity survives a breach of trust,87 even if the
expense was not properly incurred,88 if those expenses benefit the trust.
Otherwise the estate would be unjustly enriched. Similarly, Section 177 of
the First Restatement makes it clear that counter-restitution is required
regardless of whether the defendant committed fraud or the plaintiff made a
mistake.89
Professor Rounds explains the trustee’s right to indemnity even when
the trustee is in default:
It is black letter law that if a trustee incurs an expense incident to an
unauthorized self dealing transaction, and in so doing confers upon the
trust estate a benefit, the trustee is ordinarily entitled to indemnity to the
extent of the benefit of the value conferred. He who seeks equity must
do equity. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts is generally in accord.
Under the Uniform Trust Code, a trustee is entitled to be reimbursed out
of the trust property, with interest as appropriate, expenses that were not
properly incurred in the administration of the trust to the extent
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the trust.90

87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS: INDEMNITY OF TRUSTEE FOR EXPENSES
§ 244 cmt. e (1959) ("If the trustee has properly incurred an expense for which he would be
entitled to indemnity but has also incurred a liability for a breach of trust . . . the amount of
his liability can be set off against the amount to which he would otherwise be entitled as
indemnity . . . ."); id. § 244 cmt. c ("To the extent to which the trustee is entitled to
indemnity, he has a security interest in the trust property. He will not be compelled to
transfer the trust property to the beneficiary . . . until he is paid or secured for the amount of
expenses properly incurred . . . .").
88. See id. § 245(2) ("Although an expense is not properly incurred in the
administration of the trust, the trustee is entitled to indemnity out of the trust estate for such
expense to the extent that he has thereby conferred a benefit upon the trust estate, unless
under the circumstances it is inequitable . . . .").
89. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND
ANALOGOUS EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 177 cmt. c (1937) ("The rule stated in this Section is
applicable where the owner of property transfers it to another, being induced by fraud,
duress, undue influence or mistake, and the transferee discharges a mortgage upon the
property, or pays taxes thereon (see § 158, Comment b).").
90. Rounds, supra note 36, at 348–49 (2010) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 245 cmts. c–d (1959)); see also 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND
ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 18.1.2.6, at 1294–95 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing when a trustee
improperly incurs an expense on behalf of the trust); id. § 22.2.1, at 1634–35 (discussing
when a trustee is entitled to indemnity for expenses improperly incurred); JOHN MOWBRAY
ET AL., LEWIN ON TRUSTS ¶ 21-25, at 539–40 (17th ed. 2000) (discussing "indemnity in
respect of unauthorized transactions").
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Rounds cautions, however, that under the Uniform Trust Code,91 the denial
or delay of a trustee’s indemnity can be justified by a court after balancing
five equitable factors, including the benefit to the plaintiff.92
The Restatement (Second) of Agency93 takes a mixed view. Comment
c of Section 403 provides that a disloyal agent who profits improperly may
not deduct the amount of any expenses incurred in acquiring the profit.94
The case opinions that have addressed this obscure provision are divided.
Cases that cited the provision favorably denied some, but not all of the
disloyal agent’s expenses.95 A subsequent case that rejected the provision,
however, supported its opposition by citing a U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia opinion.96 Neither the D.C. Circuit opinion nor a
separate opinion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
specifically addresses the Restatement provision, but both cases affirm
counter-restitution for a disloyal agent.97 The D.C. Circuit opinion related
91. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 709 (2006) (providing the five appropriate grounds
for delay or denial of reimbursement for expenses which benefited the trust).
92. See Rounds, supra note 36, at 349 n.246 (discussing the Uniform Trust Code).
Section 709 of the Uniform Trust Code provides:
Appropriate grounds . . . [for delay or even denying reimbursement for expenses
which benefited the trust] . . . include: (1) [W]hether the trustee acted in bad
faith in incurring the expense; (2) whether the trustee knew that the expense was
inappropriate; (3) whether the trustee reasonably believed the expense was
necessary for the preservation of the trust estate; (4) whether the expense has
resulted in a benefit; and (5) whether indemnity can be allowed without
defeating or impairing the purposes of the trust.
Uniform Trust Code § 709 (2006).
93. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY (1958).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: LIABILITIES § 403 cmt. c (1958) ("An
agent who receives a bribe or otherwise profits improperly cannot, in an action by the
principal to recover it or its value, deduct the amount of expenses to which he has been put
in acquiring it.").
95. See Raymond Farmers Elevator Co. v. Am. Surety Co., 290 N.W. 231, 235 (Minn.
1940) (agreeing with Restatement of Agency in disallowing truck operating costs but
allowing the cost of grain in grain sale revenue).
96. See Burg v. Miniature Precision Components, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 192, 199 (Wis.
1983) ("The court of appeals thoroughly analyzed this issue and in a well-reasoned opinion
concluded that . . . it would be unfair to the agent and provide a windfall to the principal to
deprive the agent of his or her gross receipts without permitting a deduction for legitimate
business expenses.").
97. See Jay v. Gen. Realties Co., 49 A.2d 752, 755 (D.C. 1946) ("But we think that
save in exceptional cases such a rule is too harsh . . . . This is the reasoning of a number of
cases which declare that the net rather than the gross profit realized by an agent should be
the measure of recovery." (citing Anderson Cotton Mills v. Royal Mfg. Co., 20 S.E.2d 818
(N.C. 1942))); see also Willis v. Van Woy, 20 So. 2d 690, 692 (Fla. 1945) (stating that the
value of services should be ascertained and that amount credited against the agent’s secret
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to the secret profit of a real estate agent and the Fourth Circuit opinion to a
federal government employee who made a profit smuggling goods into
India under cover of his position at Association for Indians Development
(AID).98
Inexplicably, Section 403 of the Restatement of Agency was recently
cited by the Third Restatement without mention of Section 439, which
contradicts Section 403:99
Indemnity is allowed, even though in the transaction the agent
committed a breach of trust. Thus where an agent, who is authorized to
buy property, makes a secret profit, the principal must indemnify the
agent for his proper expenditures, although entitled to any improper
profit made by the agent.100

Using the analogy of quasi-trustee inevitably leads to the conclusion that
the defendant in an unjust enrichment case has a right to prove counterrestitution just as much as the defaulting trustee is entitled to indemnity.
Furthermore, the standard for trustee indemnity, examining the benefit to
the plaintiff, can provide a broader foundation for reviewing proposed
counter-restitution. Professor Charles Rounds agrees:

profit which has been awarded as damages to the plaintiff); Schwarting v. Artel, 40 Cal.
App. 2d 433, 441 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940) ("[W]here an agent has secretly profited . . . to
the end that equity be done to all parties, he is entitled to be reimbursed for any portion of
the purchase money advanced by him and for all expense necessarily incurred by him in
protecting and conserving the property of his principal."); Sawyer v. Issenhuth, 141 N.W.
378, 380 (S.D. 1913) ("Defendant and his wife . . . held the legal title to said real estate in
trust for plaintiff, and when defendant later sold the same plaintiff was entitled to the net
proceeds or profits of such sale over and above what she had already received from
defendant."); Judevine v. Hardwick, 49 Vt. 180, 182 (Vt. 1876) (stating that an agent must
account to his principal for whatever profits he makes); Dutton v. Willner, 52 N.Y. 312, 319
(N.Y. 1873) (ordering the arrant agent to pay the proceeds of the life insurance policy to the
principal’s estate but the agent was credited for premium payments).
98. See United States v. Wight, 839 F.2d 193, 197 (4th Cir. 1987) ("In determining the
amount of wrongful profits that a principal may recover from an agent, the trial court must
deduct the agent’s expenses." (citing Jay v. Gen. Realties Co., 49 A.2d 752, 755 (D.C.
1946))).
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (2011)
(stating that Illustration 21 is based on Section 403, cmt. c).
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: CONTRACTUAL AND RESTITUTIONAL DUTIES
AND LIABILITIES § 439 cmt. a (citing Schwarting v. Artel, 105 P.2d 380 (1940)); see also
SCOTT, supra note 37, § 243 ("Although the trustee is denied compensation because of
breaches of trust committed by him, he is not denied indemnity for expenses properly
incurred by him; but his liability for loss resulting from a breach of trust may be set off
against him claim to indemnity.").
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Whether it is the case of the trustee of an express trust who has engaged
in unauthorized self-dealing or the proprietary remedial constructive
trustee of someone else’s IP rights, this equitable right of indemnity is
grounded in Equity’s contribution to the law of unjust enrichment,
specifically the equitable right of counter-restitution. The court in equity
is loath to fashion a remedy that leaves either party unjustly enriched.101

VI. Counter-Restitution
"‘If you are fraudulently induced to buy a cake you may return it and get
back your price; but you cannot both eat your cake and return your
cake.’"102

This Article advocates recognition of a rule of counter-restitution that
requires the court to provide a defendant the opportunity to prove that the
amount of unjust enrichment initially established by the plaintiff should be
reduced or "set-off" on account of apportionment or reasonable expenses
necessary to maintain the plaintiff’s asset or generate the revenues that
benefitted the plaintiff.
Few observers would deny the importance of counter-restitution,
because it manifests the court in equity’s commitment to fairness and
justice for both parties. When a court in equity weighs a remedy, it strives
to leave neither party unjustly enriched. George Palmer explains this key
feature in relation to rescission claims:
The requirement that a party who obtains restitution must return or
otherwise account for benefits received in an exchange transaction does
not rest on a principle of mechanics: that since the transaction is being
rescinded it necessarily follows that there must be a reexchange of
benefits transferred on each side. Instead, the true basis of the
requirement is to prevent the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff, who is
himself seeking restitution based on the defendant’s unjust
enrichment.103

101.
102.

Rounds, supra note 36, at 349.
CHARLES MITCHELL & PAUL MITCHELL, LANDMARK CASES IN THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION 143 (2006) (quoting Clarke v. Dickson (1858) EB & E 148, 152–54; 120 ER
463, 465–66).
103. See PALMER, supra note 40, § 3.12, at 303; see also Packet Co. v. Sickles, 86 U.S.
611, 617–18 (1873) ("It is that of converting the infringer into a trustee for the patentee as
regards the profits thus made; and the adjustment of these profits is subject to all the
equitable considerations which are necessary to do complete justice between the
parties . . . .").
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At times the principle of "total equity" is also supported by (1) the maxim
that to get equity you must do equity;104 (2) the belief that to deny counterrestitution can result in the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff;105 and (3) the
belief that to deny counter-restitution would punish the defendant, a result
repugnant to courts in equity.106
The key issues, exacerbated by the surge in litigation by federal
agencies, are whether all defendants are entitled to the opportunity to prove
appropriate counter-restitution, and whether this opportunity is regularly
withheld, as a matter of law, from predefined subgroups or a certain type of
individual defendant because of the nature of their unjust acts.
The process of measuring unjust enrichment is often described as a
two-step process107: (1) for the plaintiff to shift the burden of proof by
identifying the relevant assets or revenues in defendant’s possession that
relate to the unjust act; and (2) for the defendant to prove adjustments for
counter-restitution.108 "Just as the trustee must substantiate any claims for
indemnity, the defendant in a claim for unjust enrichment in equity has the
burden of proving all offsets for counter-restitution."109 In practice, the
104. See Stanley v. Gadsby, 35 U.S. 521, 522 (1836) (holding that to be entitled to
injunctive relief against a usurious creditor, the debtor must offer to pay interest and
principal); Cardiac Thoracic v. Bond, 840 S.W.2d 188, 193 (Ark. 1992) ("The equitable
objective of a return to the status quo as the result of a rescission is consistent with the
equitable maxim ‘he who seeks equity must do equity.’").
105. See DAN DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3, at 254–55 (1973)
(stating that rescission is normally accompanied by restitution on both sides, which "restores
the pre-existing state of affairs"). The Restatement of Restitution is in full accord: "Where
the right to restitution is dependent upon restoration by the person seeking restitution, he
cannot enforce a constructive trust without making restoration." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
RESTITUTION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 177 (1937).
106. See Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 145 (1888) superseded by statute, Act of
Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79587, 60 Stat. 778, as recognized in Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex
Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983) ("[I]t is inconsistent with the ordinary principles and practice of
courts of chancery . . . to permit the wrongdoer . . . to undertake to punish him by obliging
him to pay more than a fair compensation to the person wronged."); see also Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 400 (1940) (stating that the infringer must
only account for the "fruits of the advantage" which he derived from the infringement);
Christensen v. National Brake & Electric Co, 10 F.2d 856, 862 (E.D. Wis. 1926) (noting that
equity is loath to fashion a remedy that is "punitive").
107. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 69 (2d Cir. 2006).
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 172 cmt. b (1959) (stating the trustee’s
duty to render accounts); id. at § 179 (discussing the duty to keep trust property separate
from the trustee’s own property); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg.
Co., 225 U.S. 604, 619 (1912) (stating that the plaintiff was entitled only "to recover such
part of the commingled profits as was attributable to the use of [the plaintiff’s] invention").
109. Roach, supra note 17, at 516–17; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION &
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 (2011) ("This means that the defendant bears the burden of
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court has awarded the defendant’s revenues in only about 60% of the cases
in which the defendant defaulted on this burden.110 Alternatively, the court
may estimate those expenses. The Federal and Second Circuits have held
that the court has an obligation to estimate those expenses when the
defendant has not introduced adequate evidence.111
Of course, if the defendant fails her burden of proof and the court
awards the defendant’s revenues, then the revenues are awarded by default
and not as a matter of law.112 It is unfortunate that in this area of the law,
some opinions, in citing precedents that supposedly support gross
disgorgement at law, fail to distinguish opinions that hold for gross
disgorgement at law from disgorgement by default. Thus some holdings for
disgorgement at law are supported by opinions that only awarded gross
disgorgement as a result of the defendant’s failure to evidence any noninfringing expenses or a finding of contempt.113
establishing appropriate deductions from gross revenues to calculate net profits, and the
parallel burden of establishing the portion of such profits that is derived from elements other
than the defendant’s wrongdoing.").
110. See George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied Jurisdiction and
Exaggerated Remedies in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 61
(2007) ("Out of approximately 116 opinions, the court held the defendant in default and
ordered her to disgorge her revenues in seventy-three opinions. In the remaining forty-three
opinions, the court acknowledged the default rule but approved an alternative estimate or
rule of thumb to establish the defendant’s benefit . . . ."). See, e.g., Stenograph L.L.C. v.
Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (choosing to not disturb the
judgment that reflects revenues in part); Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Two Wheel Corp., 918
F.2d 1060, 1064 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that awarding of gross revenues is "clearly
excessive"); Blackman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 1160, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(concluding that the plaintiff carried its burden in establishing revenues earned by the
defendant for the infringement, and that the defendant failed to establish expenses).
111. See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 103 (2d Cir.
1989) ("Even if Zarcone does not offer evidence of his costs (as he has not heretofore), the
court should estimate them based on the evidence before it."); see also Dayva Int’l v. Award
Prods. Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4386, at *10–11 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Thus, a trial court
only has an independent duty to apportion profits, even where the defendant fails to present
evidence, if it is clear from the record that not all the profits claimed are attributable to the
infringement."); H-D Mich. Inc. v. Bikers Dream, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17259, at *22
(C.D. Cal. 1998) ("South County argues that, in the absence of evidence proving its costs,
the trier of fact has a duty to estimate expenses. . . . [T]he Court may estimate costs when
the Defendant has provided some basis on which costs may be determined.").
112. See Roach, supra note 110, at 61 (discussing what occurs when the defendant fails
to satisfy its burden of proof).
113. Compare Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373, 384
(D. Conn. 2009) (providing a formula for calculating redress for consumer injury (citing
F.T.C. v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 767 (10th Cir. 2004)), with Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 766 (10th Cir. 2004) ("Accordingly, when the FTC has proven a
pattern or practice of contemptuous conduct at the liability stage by clear and convincing
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For example, consider the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Securities &
Exchange Commission v. JT Wallenbrock & Associates.114 That opinion
justified the exclusion of any credit for expenses with a quote from
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Blavin.115 Yet the Michigan district
court and the Sixth Circuit in Blavin did not consider the issue of any
offsetting expenses.116 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit erroneously justifies
gross disgorgement by citing a case awarding disgorgement by default.
The position of the Third Restatement on the right to prove counterrestitution is both mixed and unclear. A brief summary of the dispersed
discussion of counter-restitution would show the following: counterrestitution is required in most cases and is required as to specific expenses
in selected groups of cases;117 denying counter-restitution is punitive;118 and
certain groups of cases do not warrant counter-restitution, including but not
limited to intentional fraud,119 conversion of personal property, and trespass
to minerals.120 Even as explained in the various sections and in the context
of existing case law, these principles conflict. If a fraud-feasor is denied
counter-restitution as a matter of law, that defendant is being assessed a
evidence, a presumption arises that allows the district court to use all revenue attributable to
the contemptuous conduct . . . as a baseline for assessing sanctions.").
114. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1117
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the district court did not err in assessing the entire $253.2
million of disgorgement against the defendants or in imposing joint and several liability).
115. See id. at 1115; see also Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 714 (6th
Cir. 1985) (holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment, its
disgorgement order, and its disgorgement distribution plan).
116. See generally Blavin, 760 F.2d 706; Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Blavin, 557 F.
Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mich. 1983); see also Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Great Lakes Equities Co.,
775 F. Supp. 211, 214 n.20 (E.D. Mich. 1991) ("Blavin does not explicitly hold that no
deductions may be taken for expenses; the issue of expenses is never directly addressed.").
117. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 158 cmt. b (1937) ("[I]n the absence
of extraordinary circumstances requiring the imposition of a penalty, if a person by fraud
obtains title to land subject to a mortgage and pays the mortgage, he is entitled to
compensation for such payment upon being required to surrender the land."); see also id.
§ 177 cmt. c (stating that the defendant need not surrender property to the plaintiff without
reimbursement for the payment of liens and taxes).
118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. h
(2011) ("Denial of an otherwise appropriate deduction, by making the defendant liable in
excess of net gains, results in a punitive sanction that the law of restitution normally attempts
to avoid.").
119. See id. § 13 cmt. c (stating that this Restatement does not describe the substantive
law of misrepresentation and therefore does not govern matters such as fraud).
120. See infra Part VIII (providing an analysis of gross disgorgement awarded for
conversion of personal property, trespass to minerals and intentional fraud, which should be
considered exceptions to the first three principles).
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punitive remedy. Comment e(3) of Section 51 notwithstanding,121 punitive
remedies in equity are not just "to be avoided" but are outside of the
jurisdiction of a court in equity.122 Section 177, Comment c of the First
Restatement also contradicts Sections 13 and 54 of the Third Restatement,
as the fraud-feasor does not have to make specific restitution of real
property unless the plaintiff provides counter-restitution for taxes, mortgage
payments, and other expenses.123

121. See infra note 160 and accompanying text (stating that restitution attempts to avoid
any punitive remedies).
122. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 270 (1993) ("As this Court has long
recognized, courts of equity would not . . . enforce penalties or award punitive damages. . . .
[T]his limitation on equitable relief applied in the trust context as well, where plaintiffs
could recover compensatory monetary relief for a breach of trust, but not punitive or
exemplary damages."); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987) ("A civil penalty was
a type of remedy at common law that could only be enforced in courts of law. Remedies
intended to punish culpable individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract
compensation or restore the status quo, were issued by courts of law, not . . . equity." (citing
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 536 (1970)));
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 405 (1940) ("[W]e perceive no
ground for saying that in awarding profits to the copyright proprietor as a means of
compensation, the court may make an award of profits which have been shown not to be due
to the infringement."); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 116 n.25 (2d Cir.
2006) ("Because the remedy is remedial rather than punitive, the court may not order
disgorgement above this amount." (citing Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971))); In re Estate of Corriea, 719 A.2d 1234, 1239 (D.C.
1998) (stating that disgorgement is meant to provide just compensation and not impose a
penalty, much like a constructive trust); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am.
Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 77 n.10 (3d Cir. 1993) (distinguishing "profits" from
"proceeds"); id. at 78 ("The hardship of investor losses should not, however, be used as an
excuse to impose a remedy under circumstances in which the scope of relief falls outside
that remedy’s recognized parameters."); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. First City Fin. Corp.,
Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Disgorgement is an equitable remedy designed
to deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment and to deter others from violating securities
laws."); Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 782 F.2d 1249, 1253
(5th Cir. 1986) (stating that the penalty imposed is not authorized by law because it
constitutes a "penalty"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 42 cmt. i (2011) ("There are instances of wrongdoing in which the law of
restitution imposes [a punitive element of damages].").
123. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 177 (1937);
("The owner cannot compel the transferee to surrender the property to him without
reimbursing him for such expenditures."); see also Sanguinetti v. Strecker, 577 P.2d 404,
410 (Nev. 1978) ("[E]ven a fraudulent grantee is entitled to reimbursement of ‘necessary
expenditures in preserving the property.’" (quoting Morris v. Hanssen, 78 S.W.2d 87, 95
(Mo. 1934))); Farnum v. Silvano, 540 N.E.2d 202, 206 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that
the plaintiff’s claim for fraud was entitled to rescission subject to reimbursing the defendant
for taxes and repairs).
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Applying trust law’s benefit standard for trustee indemnity would offer
a useful default rule for scrutinizing proposed counter-restitution. The
combination of the benefit standard, public policy issues, and the exclusion
of infringing expenses probably accounts for the majority of scrutiny of
counter-restitution for IP claims. In Comment e of Section 51, the Third
Restatement advocates three justifications: (1) the benefit standard; (2) the
priority to avoid an unfair or punitive remedy; and (3) the doctrine of the
officious claimant.124 The last standard is asserted as a baseline standard
for all counter-restitution for willful defendants subjected to a claim for
unjust enrichment, perhaps echoing doctrine expressed in Section 3 of the
Third Restatement.125
As an explanation for rejecting liability in some cases or for the
rationale underlying the benefit standard, the officious claimant doctrine
provides a rationale for the defendant to bear the burden of proof to show
that her expenses or expenditures actually benefitted the plaintiff.
However, the language in Sections 3 and 51 of the Third Restatement may
be interpreted to say that counter-restitution should only be awarded as a
matter of equitable discretion. As such, it would contradict the existing
practice of IP claims and trust law for indemnity and others.
For example, a paradox continues in the Second Circuit between the
Emergency Assistance Standard (EAS) and most IP claims. Under the
EAS, the plaintiff who provides emergency assistance which proves of
benefit to the defendant is only entitled to reimbursement for proven
marginal operating costs.126 Alternatively, in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp.,127 it was established that Metro-Goldwyn Pictures (MGM)
bargained with the plaintiff owner of a copyright in bad faith to license the
script, and when negotiations broke down, MGM arranged to license
another cheap script to cover up its misappropriation of the plaintiff’s

124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (2011)
(discussing what questions must be asked and what factors must be considered to determine
what profits of the defendant are attributable to the underlying wrong).
125. See id. § 3 (2011) (describing how a claimant can recover more than a provable
loss so that the defendant may be stripped of a wrongful gain).
126. See United States v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 580 F.2d 1122, 1127 (2d Cir.
1978); Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 553 F.2d
830, 835 (2d Cir. 1977).
127. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 1939),
aff’d, 309 U.S. 390 (1940) (holding that the borrowing was a deliberate plagiarism,
defendants cannot be credited for any costs but what they paid for and the defendant’s share
of net profits is limited to one-fifth).
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script.128 Judge Hand, in an opinion that is cited frequently and approvingly
in the Restatements, held that counter-restitution for MGM must include
lavish salaries and bonuses for MGM’s key executives as well as generous
credit for overhead and other fixed expenses that are normally associated
with the movie-making process but not specifically with the movie in
question.129 To reconcile these doctrines for measuring counter-restitution,
one would be compelled to conclude that the Second Circuit endorsed the
notion that it is better for the defendant to take than to give.
The rule proposed herein would envision gross disgorgement only for
conversion of personal property and trespass to minerals. The next two
sections will examine disgorgement by default to develop various
conditions to the defendant’s right to counter-restitution, and analyze
existing cases for gross disgorgement to determine if there are additional
types of defendants which deserve no opportunity to prove counterrestitution because of the unjust nature of their acts.
VII. Disgorgement by Default
Counter-restitution and indemnity are conditioned on the defendant
supporting his claim for offsets in such a way that any expenses or
expenditures claimed must not be "infringing expenses" or otherwise
violate the Court’s interpretation of public policy limits.130 Thus, the
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s proposed counter-restitution in
Callaghan v. Myers131 because the defendant was seeking credit for the
labor expense of copying the plaintiff’s protected material.132 Infringing
expenses are frequently, but not necessarily, the services of the
defendant.133 The Supreme Court also rejected counter-restitution for the
128. See id. at 49 (providing background facts of the case).
129. See id. at 51–53 (addressing the defendant’s objections).
130. See Roach, supra note 110, at 67–73 (2007) (providing a survey of rulings on
infringing expenses in IP cases).
131. See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 667 (1888) (holding that the lower court
decision was correct except with respect to the damages owed for one of the book volumes
at issue).
132. See id. at 664 (1888) (rejecting counter-restitution for the salaries of the two
owners as infringing expenses).
133. See City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 139 (1877)
("[T]he defendant will not be allowed to diminish the show of profits by putting in
unconscionable claims for personal services or other inequitable deductions.") (citations
omitted).
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costs of rendering standing timber into lumber in E.E. Wooden-Ware Co. v.
United States,134 holding that it would be against public policy to otherwise
encourage willful trespass on federal lands to gain timber for lumber.135
Given the breadth of public policy issues, especially in a court of equity, the
criterion cannot be fully defined and probably "swallows" the issue of
infringing expenses.
Traditional case law has typically rejected the services of the
defendant or her immediate associates as infringing, especially if those
services have a causal connection to the underlying unjust acts.136 The
modern trend appears to be less focused on automatic rejection than
reviewing the details to determine whether the defendant’s services
benefited the plaintiff and should therefore be considered for partial or even
full credit. The trend is found in both IP cases137 and fiduciary cases.138 It
is significant that the modern standard is frequently applied to the issuing of
fees, if any, to lawyers that have committed disloyal acts. Counterrestitution for such a critical fiduciary agent should be the most difficult
standard for compensation for the services of a willful defendant. The
Texas Supreme Court favorably cited the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers to justify a flexible approach:
A lawyer engaging in clear and serious violation of duty to a client may
be required to forfeit some or all of the lawyer’s compensation for the
matter. In determining whether and to what extent forfeiture is
appropriate, relevant considerations include the gravity and timing of the
violation, its willfulness, its effect on the value of the lawyer’s work for

134. See E.E. Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432, 437 (1882) (holding
that the lower court’s valuation of damages was proper).
135. See id. at 434 (citing Livingstone v. Raywards Coal Co., 5 App. Cas. 25 (1880)).
136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 cmt. g (1995) ("The
value of defendant’s own labor . . . and salaries and wages paid to persons responsible for
the tortious conduct, are not ordinarily deductible. Distributions of profits to partners or
stockholders are also not ordinarily deductible.").
137. See, e.g., Int’l Consulting Servs. v. Cheap Tickets, Inc., No. 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 71689, at *17–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (determining that crediting the defendant for
employee salaries was appropriate); see also Hair Assocs., Inc. v. Nat’l Hair Replacement
Servs., 987 F. Supp. 569, 595 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (determining what calculation of revenues
and expenses is appropriate).
138. See, e.g., City of Fort Worth v. Pippen, 439 S.W.2d 660, 667 (Tex. 1969) (stating
that fiduciaries in breach could present evidence of counter-restitution based on the benefit
to the plaintiff city); see also Boston Children’s Heart Found., Inc. v. Nadal-Ginard, 73 F.3d
429, 435 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that a court can require a fiduciary to forfeit the right to
retain or receive compensation for conduct in violation of his or her fiduciary duty, even
absent a showing of actual injury to the principal).
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the client, any other threatened or actual harm to the client, and the
adequacy of other remedies.139

That opinion cites cases relating to the law of eighteen other states that
support the policy against automatic forfeiture of all of the fees in
question.140
There are also two overlapping groups of cases that hold that the
willfulness of the defendant justifies the denial of allocated overhead as an
offset to the defendant’s disgorgement, although neither group would
dispute the defendant’s right to prove counter-restitution. First, there is the
Sheldon–Hamill line of cases.141 The Second Circuit was recently faced
with a dilemma in Hamill America, Inc. v. G.F.I.,142 an appeal of a district
court’s opinion that overhead should be denied in the measure of the
monetary remedy in equity, an opinion that challenged the Second Circuit’s
opinion in Sheldon. As I explained in a prior article,143 Judge Martin made
a strong argument, compatible with the rationale of the Third Restatement’s
position in Section 51,144 for reversing that portion of the Sheldon opinion.
The Second Circuit acknowledged Martin’s argument but it remanded
the case with a compromise:
Unlike the district court, we are not prepared to abandon the teachings
of Sheldon in favor of a hard and fast rule denying all overhead
deductions to willful infringers. But we share the district court’s
concern that willful infringers should not be permitted to subsidize the
sale of legitimate goods with the sale of infringing goods by "passing
part of its fixed cost on to the copyright holder." We also recognize that
"a rule of liability which merely takes away profits from an infringement
would offer little discouragement to infringers." We therefore conclude
that Sheldon’s two-step approach must be applied with particular rigor
in the case of willful infringement.145

139.

Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 241 (Tex. 1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
§ 49 cmt. a, b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)).
140. See id. at 241 n.45.
141. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939), aff’d, 309
U.S. 390 (1940); Hamil Am., Inc. v. SGS Studio, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 386, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
142. See Hamil Am., Inc. v. G.F.I., 193 F.3d 92, 108–09 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that
the lower court erroneously barred the defendant from deducting expenses and reversing in
part for a recalculation of damages).
143. See Roach, supra note 17, at 556–68 (discussing Sheldon and Hamil).
144. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (discussing remedies that deny the
incentive to infringe).
145. Hamil, 193 F.3d at 106–07 (citations omitted).
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The gist of the compromise is simple: After applying "rigorous scrutiny"
to the defendant’s proposed counter-restitution, Judge Martin is
authorized to reject the proposed expenses, but, in the meantime, the
Second Circuit avoids having to overturn part of Sheldon. The difference
between scrutiny and rigorous scrutiny, however, seems at best
metaphysical unless it is just another form of equitable discretion. The
Third Restatement, however, supports the Hamill opinion, inexplicably
concluding that the Second Circuit "reviewed the extensive authorities
permitting deductions from profits on account of allocable overhead."146
The second line of cases follows from a research error in Sheldon.147
Comment b of Section 158 of the First Restatement provides that the
willful or fraudulent defendant is entitled to reimbursement for the
payment of taxes or satisfying other liens on the property.148 Comment d
of Section 158 states that such a defendant’s expenditures for capital
improvements are not entitled to reimbursement (presumably as an
extension of the mistaken improvement doctrine).149 Judge Hand
juxtaposed capital improvements with expense and advised that trustee
expenses could not be reimbursed.150 Judge Hand’s analysis was not even
a fair statement in 1948 of the law relating to indemnity for disloyal
trustees.151

146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 cmt. i (2011).
147. See Sheldon, 106 F.2d at 51 (stating that "a constructive trustee, who consciously
misappropriates the property of another, is often refused allowance even of actual
expenses"). Note that the Second Circuit’s opinion was affirmed by the Supreme Court, but
the Supreme Court expressed no opinion on specific issues relating to offsetting expenses,
which were dismissed as questions of fact. See also F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary
Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 234 (1962) (distinguishing its set of facts from those in Sheldon).
148. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: RULES GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO
ACTIONS FOR RESTITUTION § 158 cmt. b (1937) ("[I]f a person by fraud obtains title to land
subject to mortgage and pays the mortgage, he is entitled to compensation for such payment
upon being required to surrender the land.").
149. See id. § 158 cmt. d (1937) ("The conscious wrongdoer is ordinarily not allowed
compensation for an improvement or addition . . . . This is consistent with the rule of
damages in [conversion] actions . . . in which case the . . . wrongdoer is required to pay for
the full value of the chattel as improved by him before demand for its return.").
150. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Hand’s erroneous
rationale Sheldon).
151. See Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry. Co., 78 F. Supp. 312, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)
(discussing what traffic expenses, if any, can be set off against the judgment); see also Lewis
v. Ingram, 57 F.2d 463, 465 (10th Cir. 1932) ("An unfaithful trustee is not entitled to any
compensation for his services. . . . It does not, however, follow that he forfeits moneys
advanced by him to the trust fund." (citations omitted)).
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Judge Hand’s dicta had no impact on his opinion because he allowed
practically all of the counter-restitution that MGM could devise. The
dicta did cause some trouble for subsequent cases.152 Where the First
Restatement stated that capital improvements by willful defendants were
not entitled to counter-restitution, the plaintiff in a Ninth Circuit case
quoted the Second Circuit opinion in Sheldon for the proposition that "a
court may automatically deny a willful infringer any deduction from profits
of overhead expenses."153 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
correctly rejected the plaintiff’s claim by pointing out that the Second
Circuit found the defendant in Sheldon to have acted willfully, but still
allowed allocated overhead.154 However the Ninth Circuit volunteered that
"[a] portion of an infringer’s overhead properly may be deducted from
gross revenues to arrive at profits, at least where the infringement was not
willful, conscious, or deliberate."155 This dictum had little effect on the
Ninth Circuit, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted
the theory.156
While the common law remedy of an accounting in equity requires
proof of willfulness to warrant the award of the defendant’s unjust
enrichment,157 there is no legal doctrine to justify the notion that any
152. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1939)
(citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 158 cmt. d (1937)). For cases quoting the
misstatement favorably, see Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., 741 P.2d 846, 852
("A constructive trustee who consciously misappropriates the property of another is often
refused allowance even of his actual expenses.").
153. Kamar Int’l., Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., Inc., 752 F.2d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 1984).
154. Id.
155. Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 515 (9th Cir.
1985) (citing Kamar, 752 F.2d at 1331).
156. See Saxon v. Blann, 968 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Overhead may not be
deducted from gross revenues to arrive at profits when an infringement was deliberate or
willful." (citing Frank Music, 772 F.2d at 515)); see also Mfrs. Techs., Inc. v. Cams, Inc.,
728 F. Supp. 75, 84 (D. Conn. 1989) (rejecting allocated portions of overhead due to the
willfulness of the defendant’s infringement, without referring to the opinions in the Second
Circuit or Ninth Circuit); Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14132, at *25 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that defendant’s willfulness precluded the deduction
of allocation overhead but that the defendant waived its right to appeal that ruling).
157. See PALMER, supra note 40, § 2.12, at 164 (stating that, for trademark
infringement, "an innocent infringer usually is not held accountable for profits"); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (2011) (distinguishing
"wrongdoer" from "conscious wrongdoer"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 37 (1995) (stating that one can be liable for net profits resulting from unlawful conduct if
the actor engages in intentional conduct to confuse or deceive); id. § 45 (stating that an
award of monetary relief depends on the "intent and knowledge of the actor and the nature
and extent of any good faith reliance by the actor").
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particular offset credit depends on the defendant’s willfulness.158 The Third
Restatement provides the exception that only a defendant’s conscious or
willful actions warrant the remedy of profit disgorgement.159 Furthermore,
conditioning counter-restitution on the defendant’s willfulness proves either
too much or too little. Offsetting the defendant’s revenues for fixed costs is
either a reasonable or unreasonable measure of the defendant’s advantage,
depending on whether you subscribe to the full absorption or incremental
cost approaches. Denying allocations of fixed costs only against willful
defendants is overtly punitive and contradicts Section 42 of the Third
Restatement.160
VIII. Gross Disgorgement Cases
Property law interrupts the continuity of remedies in equity by
providing for the equivalent of specific restitution for the conversion of
personal property without counter-restitution for beneficial expenses. The
First and Third Restatements provide for counter-restitution of beneficial
expenses for real property, but counter-restitution for capital expenditures is
controlled by the equitable considerations associated with mistaken
improvements.161 Neither of these doctrines apply to the misappropriation
of intellectual property or other forms of intangible property because, even
today, many jurisdictions hold that such intangibles cannot be converted.162
At least one British authority asserts that accident plays a significant role in
the distinct forms of restitution for differing types of property.163
158. See ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1169 n.2 (W.D. Wash. 1999)
(arguing that case law does not require or justify barring a defendant from putting on
evidence regarding overhead costs and that such evidence must be admissible); In re Indep.
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1251 (D. Kan. 1998) ("The court finds that
the deductibility of [the defendant’s] fixed overhead costs does not depend on whether [the
defendant’s] infringement was willful or not.").
159. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 cmt. c
(2011) ("When the defendant has acted in conscious disregard of the claimant’s rights, the
whole of any resulting gain is treated as unjust enrichment, even though the defendant’s gain
may exceed both (i) the measurable injury to the plaintiff, and (ii) the reasonable value of
license authorizing the defendant’s conduct.").
160. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 cmt. i
(2011) (discussing punitive accounting).
161. See id. § 40 (discussing equitable remedies for trespass and conversion).
162. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting that most states do not recognize
a conversion claim for intangible property).
163. See Her Majesty’s Attorney General v. Blake, [2001] 1. A.C. 268 (H.L.). Lord
Nicholls concluded that the difference in remedies for intellectual property and tangible
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The gross disgorgement cases relating to trespass to precious minerals
or resources is an amalgam of rationales, but generally hold that an
intentional trespass to timber, coal, oil, gold and other scarce resources
should be remedied by the disgorgement of revenues, generally without
reimbursement for operating or development expenses.164 Holdings vary as
to what stage in the development/refinery process the minerals have to be
valued and how much, if any, of the mining, development or refining costs
can be passed on to the plaintiff; but it is not uncommon for the willful
defendant to receive no counter-restitution for the principal exploration and
development costs of bringing the minerals to the surface. Current case law
is largely dictated by various state statutes, but the Third Restatement also
acknowledges this doctrine as a generalization of the case law.165 The
origin of this widely-practiced exception to counter-restitution has varied
rationales: denying counter-restitution as outside public policy;166 awarding
the financial equivalent of specific restitution, similar to converted personal
property;167 and even one set of cases in which the English judge admitted
wanting to punish the defendant.168

property is a happenstance of history:
Considered as a matter of principle, it is difficult to see why equity required the
wrongdoer to account for all his profits in these cases, whereas the common
law’s response was to require a wrongdoer merely to pay a reasonable fee for
use of another’s land or goods. In all these cases rights of property were
infringed. This difference in remedial response appears to have arisen simply as
an accident of history.
Id. at 280.
164. For the majority rule on conversion of personal property and trespass to minerals,
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 (2011).
165. Id. See generally V. Woerner, Right of Trespasser to Credit for Expenditures in
Producing, As Against His Liability For Value of , Oil or Minerals, 21 A.L.R.2d 380 (1952).
166. See E.E. Wooden-Ware Co. v. United States, 106 U.S. 432, 434 (1882) (denying
restitution of logging expenses for timber converted in national forests).
167. See Ripy v. Less, 188 S.W. 1084, 1086 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) (debating the
appropriate time of conversion for timber, and stating that it depends on the circumstances of
each case).
168. Modern English authorities state that the more appropriate precedent is actually
Martin v. Porter, 151 Eng. Rep. 149 (Ex. Ct. 1839), and is regarded as a punitive measure.
See also EDELMAN, supra note 63, at 138 (discussing Martin, an English case in which the
court refused to give allowance for the work done in order to punish and deter willful
trespasses).
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A. Fraud

In contrast to Palmer169 and Dobbs,170 the Third Restatement maintains
that defendants in willful fraud claims should be denied counter-restitution for
direct costs. Comment h of Section 51 of the Third Restatement advises that
"[t]he defendant will not be allowed a credit for the direct expenses of an
attempt to defraud the claimant, even if these expenses produce some benefit to
the claimant."171 The Comment is an example of a disloyal real estate agent
who makes a secret profit from the plaintiff, and the Illustration concludes that
the agent should disgorge the profit without offsetting credit for the real estate
commission or any reasonable expenses. While the Restatement’s assertion
may be true in some circumstances, it is not true in all circumstances, nor is it
fully supported by the cases cited.172 The cases cited in the Third Restatement
support the doctrine that disloyal agents are subject to forfeiting their fees and
to disgorging their secret profits; they do not necessarily deny substantiated,
reasonable expenses incurred for the benefit of the plaintiff. Section 403 of the
Restatement of Agency is also offered for support, but it has already been

169. See PALMER, supra note 40, § 3.11, at 294 ("When goods or services have been
exchanged pursuant to contract, and the plaintiff seeks restitution of the value he transferred,
it will generally be necessary for him to return or otherwise account for the value he
received."). Palmer further stated, "This will be true whether his right to restitution is based
on fraud, innocent misrepresentation, breach of contract, mistake or any other ground." Id.
170. See DOBBS, supra note 46, § 9.3(1), at 579–81 (stating that as a part of rescission
or restitution from the defendant to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is required to make restitution
to the defendant for assets or services received from the defendant); id. § 9.3(3), at 593
("However, the plaintiff must account to the defendant only for actual benefits received
when the transaction is avoided.").
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. h
(2011).
172. The case of Ward v. Taggert, 336 P.2d 534 (Cal. 1959), involved a claim at law
for which the court ordered the disgorgement of the agent’s profit and fee, but denied the
defendant’s expenses on the basis that some expenses were unnecessary and the remaining
expenses were unsubstantiated by the defendant. Id. at 539. The case of Ellison v. Alley,
842 S.W.2d 605 (Tenn. 1992), merely held that a disloyal real estate agent had to disgorge
his fee. Id. at 706–08 ("We are in agreement with the finding of breach of fiduciary duty and
the award to the plaintiff of the defendant’s profits. But, on the narrow issue upon which
this appeal was granted, we find that the defendants are not entitled to a commission on the
sale of [property]."). In Lestoque v. M.R. Mansfield Realty, Inc., 536 P.2d 1146 (Colo. App.
1975), a case for breach of fiduciary duty by a real estate agent, the court found liability only
for breach of fiduciary duty and not for fraud. Id. at 1148–50 (denying the claim for fraud
and awarding the agent’s secret profit and commission to be disgorged, refusing to offset the
agent’s expenses because they were unnecessary for the underlying transaction).
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shown that section has received little support and is over-ruled by the
specificity of Section 439.173
Generally, the holding on counter-restitution in fraud cases depends on
two issues: The extent of the defendant’s fraudulent activities as a percent
of the defendant’s total activities, and whether the expenses relate to a
transaction or an operating business. Any infringing expenses related to the
actual fraud should be excluded on the grounds of public policy. The fraudfeasor’s services are certainly in jeopardy, but even they have been credited
to the defendant.
Transactional and other expenses incurred to induce the fraud are
regularly excluded, and capital improvements can be excluded, as explained
in Comment d of Section 158 of the First Restatement.174 The remaining
expenses are effectively grouped into incidental transaction expenses or the
operating expenses and capital expenditures for maintaining real estate or a
business. Incidental transaction expenses are somewhat vulnerable, but
Illustration 21 in Section 51 of the Third Restatement overstates the
practice by asserting that an unfaithful agent has no claim to beneficial, outof-pocket expenses.175 There is a substantial group of cases that allow
incidental expenses as counter-restitution, both in real estate cases (as
previously discussed in relation to Section 403 of the Restatement of
Agency176) and most cases related to claims by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trade Commission
(CFTC) described below.177
Dan Dobbs notes the distinction between transaction costs and
expenses for business operations:
Rents received are treated as income produced by the property itself
rather than income produced by the efforts of the defendant. That is, the
transaction costs in renting out the property are ignored, and the
defendant receives no credit for his efforts in securing a tenant. This
corresponds with the general practice of courts in other kinds of cases

173. See supra notes 87–101 and accompanying text (discussing the infringing trustee’s
right to indemnity).
174. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 158 cmt. d (1937) (addressing how to
compensate a willful wrongdoer for improvements and additions to the subject matter).
175. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 illus. 21
(2011).
176. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 224–27 and accompanying text (discussing SEC and CFTC
caselaw).
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involving simple market transactions, as distinct from those involving
operation of an ongoing business.178

Therefore, if the plaintiff seeks the defendant’s business profits, counterrestitution is likely available for some, if not all, of the defendant’s
expenses or expenditures. On the other hand, if the plaintiff is seeking the
defendant’s profit or gain on the sale of a specific asset, it is unlikely but
possible that a court will approve the offset of related expenses. The
question remains, however, whether legitimate and substantiated business
expenses must be denied for certain types of transactions.
The Third Restatement implicitly acknowledges the distinction
between transaction and business operating expenses, as it evaluates
counter-restitution for business operating expenses in three fraud
illustrations according to the benefit principle for trustee indemnity. The
fraud example in Illustration 22 in Section 51 and Illustrations 7 and 8 for
breach of fiduciary duty in Section 43 relate to business operation resulting
from fraud and constructive fraud, yet the Third Restatement expresses no
reservations about operating expenses. The only issue appears to be
whether the fraud-feasor warrants counter-restitution for his personal
services.179
Illustration 22 in Section 51 of the Third Restatement is based on a
Pennsylvania fraud case in which the court allowed offsetting credit for
business operating expenses and salary compensation for the fraud-feasor.
The Third Restatement attempts to distinguish the holding in that case from
its rule against counter-restitution for fraud-feasors on the basis of avoiding
an injustice, which is another term for equitable discretion.180 Dobbs
provides a more constrained and defined rationale by explaining that the
178. See DOBBS, supra note 46, § 9.3(4), at 601; see also Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. JT
Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that certain
"necessary" business expenses, such as commissions, telephone charges, and underwriting
expenses, are deductible regardless of the defendant’s scheme); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v.
Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 88, 95 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that even though
markup costs and expenses should be deductible, securities law violators may not insulate
certain profits from disgorgement, and "a court may consider as an offset the expenses
incurred by defendant in garnering such unjust enrichment").
179. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 illus. 22
(2011) (illustrating what happens when one party induces another party to sell a chain of
retail stores at a grossly inadequate price by making fraudulent misrepresentations); id. § 43
illus. 7 (presenting a scenario in which an attorney competes against a former client and
thereby breaches his fiduciary obligations); id. § 43 illus. 8 (describing a situation in which a
geologist misappropriates his former employers’ confidential information and thereby
violating his fiduciary duty).
180. See id. § 51 cmt. h (referencing Brooks v. Conston, 72 A.2d 75 (Pa. 1950)).
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holding is the result of the court’s determination that the husband’s services
warranted compensation because he benefitted the value of the plaintiff’s
business.181
B. Outlaws
To borrow Professor Kull’s term, are there civil "outlaws" who should
not be protected by a court in equity?182 His article explains that courts
regularly take negative action or fail to take action—such as to deny
counter-restitution to certain outlaws, including plaintiffs with unclean
hands.183 While their authority is only persuasive, British authorities on the
issue agree that "wicked" or willful defendants still should be eligible for
counter-restitution,184 except when it would violate public policy based on
the nature of the counter-restitution.185
Frank Snepp is generally on everyone’s list of potential outlaws,
especially as a comparison to the British case on Blake.186 Snepp breached
his fiduciary duty to his employer, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
by publishing a book of "memoirs" about CIA operations during the
Vietnam War and thereby revealing confidential CIA information—
although not necessarily information that jeopardized national security.187
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order for all of Snepp’s
book royalties to be deemed a constructive trust.188 After the Supreme
181. See DOBBS, supra note 46, § 9.3(4), at 602 n.42 ("The defendant’s efforts are
properly ignored if they yielded no actual benefit to the plaintiff . . . . On the other hand, if
the defendant provided services required by the transaction that is now avoided, the value of
those services should be credited to the defendant." (citing PALMER, supra note 40, § 3.12, at
304)).
182. See Kull, supra note 1, at 30 (referring to claimants in restitution cases as outlaws
due to their treatment by courts).
183. See id. at 31 ("[R]estitution . . . will sometimes treat the claimant’s bad behavior as
an affirmative defense.").
184. See ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 176 (2d ed. 2005) ("‘Though
the defendant has been fraudulent, he must not be robbed, nor must the plaintiff be unjustly
enriched, as he would be if he both got back what he had parted with and kept what he had
received in return.’" (citations omitted)).
185. See PETER BIRKS, RESTITUTION—THE FUTURE 128–32 (1992) (stating that even
"wicked" defendants receive counter-restitution, except when the defendant’s reimbursement
would be against public policy).
186. See generally United States v. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Her Majesty’s
Attorney General v. Blake, [2001] 1 A.C. 268.
187. See Snepp, 444 U.S. at 508–09 (discussing the background facts of the case).
188. See id. at 768–69.
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Court reversed the court of appeals decision and remanded the case, the
district judge allowed counter-restitution only for Snepp’s income taxes,
which may have been required by the fact that the plaintiff was the same
federal government that received his income taxes.189 As with the motion
practice for most constructive trusts, there is no published opinion on
whether Snepp’s reasonable expenses, if any, were rejected out of public
policy or for other reasons. On the other hand, it is difficult to read the
Snepp and Blake opinions without suspecting that the legal process in both
their cases was "goal-seeking"—motivated by national security fears with
respect to Snepp and by the desire to punish or spite in any way possible
with respect to Blake.190
Equitable discretion is a necessary factor in a thorough analysis of
measuring remedies in equity.191 Few bodies of case opinions from courts
in equity can avoid acknowledging equitable discretion as a source of
unpredictability or a source of what physicists call Brownian motion.192
Owing to the origins and goals of courts in equity, their discretion is more
accepted on a policy level and given wider margin. The boundaries for
equitable discretion are wide enough to include or ‘swallow’ the outlaw
issue.193
In summary, gross disgorgement for conversion of personal property
and trespass to minerals are confirmed exceptions to the proposed rule for
counter-restitution. The remaining exceptions can be explained mostly by
concerns about public policy and the vagaries of equitable discretion.

189. See FRANK SNEPP, IRREPARABLE HARM: A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF HOW ONE
AGENT TOOK ON THE CIA IN AN EPIC BATTLE OVER SECRECY AND FREE SPEECH 357 (1st ed.
1999) ("Four months after the Supreme Court had spoken, Sally Whitaker announced that I
would be required to surrender all my royalties minus only federal income taxes within
forty-five days.").
190. See DOBBS, supra note 46, § 4.1(3), at 565 (discussing procedures that give the
plaintiff restitution by giving her title to, or a security interest in particular property, or
giving her the rights formerly held by another person).
191. See generally Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following
eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63 (2007).
192. See generally ALBERT EINSTEIN, INVESTIGATION ON THE THEORY OF BROWNIAN
MOVEMENT (1956).
193. See Rendleman, supra note 191, at 65 ("Courts make extravagant statements about
their discretion in administering equitable substantive standards.").
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IX. FTC Claims for Gross Disgorgement194
"‘Plaintiff,’ the tobacco companies protested, ‘apparently believes that
the more confusing he makes the law of restitution and indemnity
appear, the higher his likelihood of success.’"195

Federal agency claims in equity, especially those of the FTC and FDA,
comprise a body of cases in which the courts regularly award gross
disgorgement. Based on weak research that cites inapposite precedents, the
misuse of key terms, and the sympathy of many courts that appear to be
solicitous of the agency’s mandate, some district courts are awarding nontraditional remedies that are entirely outside the courts’ jurisdiction.196
Equally important are many courts’ mistaken holdings that the remedy of
consumer redress is a reasonable measure of an equity remedy.197 As most
of the opinions have been affirmed in some circuit courts, this situation may
continue to grow without reversal by the Supreme Court or Congress.
Almost ninety years after Root v. Railway Co.,198 the Supreme Court
expanded the doctrine of implied jurisdiction to statutes for federal
agencies. In Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,199 the Supreme Court held that
the full range of remedies in equity is implicit in Congress’s grant of
injunctive relief to federal agencies.200 Sixteen years later, the full range of
remedies in equity was implied in statutes without specific provision for
injunctive relief except when the remedy would be contrary to the intent of
Congress.201 The cases were of small note, but they were the foundation for
194. Any disagreement that this article might display with the FTC’s interpretation of
the doctrine of remedies in equity or the FTC’s tactics in pursuing its duties is not intended
to belittle the challenge that the FTC faces in undertaking its role as chief federal
"prosecutor" for consumer fraud.
195. Rendleman, supra note 47, at 884 (quoting S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 335 (2d ed. 1981)).
196. See Roach, supra note 17, at 543–56 (discussing federal agency claims).
197. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373, 380
(D. Conn. 2009) (measuring restitution by consumer redress).
198. See Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 216 (1881) (holding that
there are no grounds for the equitable relief sought and dismissing the complaint).
199. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 402 (1946) (holding that the
district court erred in declining to consider whether restitution was necessary or proper); see
also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (noting that the appropriate court may
issue whatever order is proper to enforce compliance).
200. See Porter, 328 U.S. at 399–400 ("The traditional equity powers of a court remain
unimpaired in a proceeding . . . so that an order of restitution can be made.").
201. See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291–92 (1960)
("When Congress entrusts to an equity court the enforcement of prohibition contained in a
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the Second Circuit opinion in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.,202 which lead to implied jurisdiction in equity for federal
agencies such as the SEC, CFTC, FTC, Department of Energy, Department
of Labor, and FDA, among others, to seek monetary remedies in equity.203
Except for some claims of the SEC after 2000,204 the sole basis for the
federal agencies to seek monetary remedies in equity was each agency’s
statutory jurisdiction to seek injunctive relief.
Recently, the Supreme Court confirmed that remedies for claims in
equity are limited to the standards for remedies in equity that were practiced
in England or the American colonies before 1789.205 In 2006, the Second
Circuit implemented the limitation on remedies in equity by initiating a
"Grupo analysis" to determine if the proposed remedy in equity was in
general practice prior to 1789.206 The Supreme Court opinions of the
nineteenth century may provide some reasonable approximations of those
standards.
Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.207 raised a
minor issue that is sometimes raised in agency cases to attempt to expand

regulatory enactment, it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic power of
equity to provide complete relief in the light of statutory purposes.").
202. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1310 (2d
Cir. 1971) (holding that the judgment is affirmed in part and reversed and remanded with
respect to an order cancelling stock options).
203. See id. at 1307–08 (discussing whether restitution can be applied under equity
powers by federal agencies).
204. As of 2000, there is statutory authority for awarding some SEC claims with "tier 3
civil penalties," which specifically allows for the disgorgement of the defendant’s gross
proceeds. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(2)(C) (2006); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii) (2006) .
205. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308,
318 (1999); see also Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975) (stating that
equity jurisdiction was a method for the Chancellor to establish equity as necessitated by
each individual case). For a slightly different standard, see Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med.
Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 362 (2006) ("[W]e examined cases and secondary legal materials
to determine if the relief would have been equitable ‘in the days of the divided bench.’")
(citations omitted).
206. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 120 (2d Cir. 2006)
(providing a historical discussion of disgorgement); see also Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F.
Supp. 2d 684, 702–03 (S.D. Tex. 2002), consolidated by 206 F.R.D. 427 (S.D. Tex. 2002),
aff’d, 302 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing restitutionary remedies in the chancery courts
of England).
207. See Grupo, 527 U.S. at 335 (holding that the district court did not have authority to
issue a preliminary injunction because such a remedy was historically unavailable from a
court of equity).
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the boundaries of an agency’s monetary remedies in equity.208 The litigants
in Grupo, Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson209 and
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.210 were companies or
individuals, not government agencies.211 Dicta in Grupo implies that the
range of available remedies in equity is broader for government claims
than private parties.212 However, a comparison of the range of remedies
provided in Stevens v. Gladding213 for individual plaintiffs does not
immediately appear to be different from that in Mitchell v. Robert
DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,214 nor does it seem sufficient to justify exempting
federal agency claims from Grupo’s boundaries for remedies in equity.215
To date, the Second Circuit opinion in Securities & Exchange
Commission v. Cavanagh216 manifests that circuit’s belief that SEC claims
are not exempt.217
208. See id. at 326 ("[C]ourts of equity will ‘go much farther both to give and withhold
relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private
interests are involved.’") (quoting United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 383
(1965); Cavanagh, 445 F.3d at 118 n.29 ("Because the challenged remedy awarded in this
case was available to private equity in plaintiffs chancery in 1789, we need not, and do not,
decide today what additional latitude a federal court might have in awarding equitable
remedies . . . .") (emphasis included); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 17203, at *31 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[D]isgorgement is a distinctly publicregarding remedy, available only to government entities seeking to enforce explicit statutory
provisions . . . .").
209. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 234 (2002)
(holding that provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act authorizing plan
participants and fiduciaries to bring civil actions to obtain "appropriate equitable relief" did
not authorize employee benefit plan to bring action for specific performance of
reimbursement provision of plan).
210. See Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., 547 U.S. 356, 368–69 (2006)
(concluding that fiduciary was seeking equitable relief and could maintain action under
Employee Retirement Income Security Act provision authorizing "appropriate equitable
relief").
211. See Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 356; Knudson, 534 U.S at 204; Grupo, 527 U.S. at 308.
212. See Grupo, 527 U.S. at 326 (stating that courts of equity will apply broader
remedies when the public interest is at issue instead of private interests).
213. See Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. 447, 454 (1855) (concluding that that the Act of
1819 did not extend equity powers of the courts to the adjudication of forfeitures and
rejecting the prayer of relief).
214. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 303 (1960)
(concluding that the district court has jurisdiction to order an employer to reimburse
employees, unlawfully discharged or otherwise discriminated against, for wages lost because
of that discharge or discrimination).
215. See Gladding, 58 U.S. at 453–55; Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 299–301.
216. Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 121 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding
that district court had authority to impose equitable remedy of disgorgement); see also Fed.
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This argument also overlooks the difference in jurisdiction between
Grupo and most agency cases. The plaintiff’s jurisdiction in Grupo was
in equity, and the Grupo issue relates to latitude provided to the
government for a claim in equity. Generally, federal agency claims enjoy
only implied jurisdiction and seek remedies ancillary to injunctive relief.
In Tull v. United States,218 the Supreme Court implies that ancillary
remedies should be less significant than the injunctive relief.219 This
implication would need to be reconciled with Porter and Mitchell, which
both held that in the absence of expressed congressional intent, the
plaintiff agency is entitled to the full range of remedies in equity in
implied jurisdiction.220 The issue was not addressed in Cavanagh and the
resolution of this conflict is not as important as the implication that
Grupo’s dicta may not apply to federal agency cases based on implied
jurisdiction.
A federal agency has implied statutory jurisdiction in equity
whenever Congress passes a statute that authorizes injunctive relief.
Ancillary to injunctive relief, the agency is free to seek monetary or other
equitable remedies so long as the relevant statutes do not specifically
preclude such remedies. Even if the agency jurisdiction is authorized by
two separate statutes, one that provides for a group of remedies including
some equitable remedies and one that provides only for injunctive relief,
the agency has sufficient implied jurisdiction to seek the full range of
equitable remedies (subject to the Grupo limitations) under the latter
provision.
Especially in FTC and FDA cases, the agencies sometimes juxtapose
terms for restitution/unjust enrichment/disgorgement/equitable remedy
and profit/benefit/gain/receipts to great advantage for their policies. In
prior articles, I have shown how opinions for the FTC justify gross
disgorgement with precedents that discuss only profit disgorgement or
Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17203, at *31 (2d Cir.
2011).
217. See id. at 117 ("[D]isgorgement has been used by the SEC and courts to prevent
wrongdoers from unjustly enriching themselves through violations, which has the effect of
deterring substantial fraud.").
218. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987) (concluding the Clean Water
Act does not guarantee jury trial to assess civil penalties under the Act).
219. See id. at 424 (stating that "a court in equity was empowered to provide monetary
awards that were incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief," but a court in equity
cannot enforce civil penalties).
220. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 290–93 (1960)
(quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397–98 (1946).
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disgorgement by default.221
So far, evidence of prosecutorial
222
aggressiveness and even agency misconduct is rare,223 but the agencies
take great liberties with terminology and inapposite precedent.
Case opinions relating to claims by the more experienced agencies
like the SEC224 and the CFTC225 are stabilizing in terms of counterrestitution. Neither agency seriously disputed that the cost for the
underlying security or commodity contract must be offset if the security
was not worthless and therefore never fully rejected counter-restitution.
The Second Circuit’s underlying commitment to apportionment and offset
for the reasonable cost of the underlying security was clear in Texas Gulf

221. See, e.g., Roach, supra note 17, at 543–56 (discussing federal agency claims).
222. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4915, at *24
n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("The SEC often takes a broad view as to what constitutes illicit
profits. . . . In contrast, the courts tend to take a more realistic approach as to what
constitutes ‘illegal’ profits, and have accepted the propriety of netting gains and losses.").
223. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1199 (10th
Cir. 2005) ("The district court’s separate judgment specifically stated the FTC’s ‘prosecution
of this action has been undertaken in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly and for oppressive
reasons.’") (citations omitted).
224. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1114
(9th Cir. 2006) (discussing the deduction of business and operating expenses); Secs. & Exch.
Comm’n v. United Energy Partners, Inc., 88 F. App’x 744, 746 (5th Cir. 2004) (affirming
the disgorgement amount awarded); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Alliance Leasing Corp., 28 F.
App’x 648, 652 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that the SEC correctly calculated the disgorgement
value); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d
Cir. 1978) (discussing the computation of disgorgement); Secs. Exch. Comm’n v. Blatt, 583
F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating the purpose of disgorgement is to deprive the
wrongdoer of his ill-gotten gain"); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. U.S. Env’tl., Inc., 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12580, at *75–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that a court can deduct direct
transaction costs from illegal profits); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Bocchino, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22047, at *6–7 (addressing the deduction of certain expenses from gross profits
incurred while garnering the illegal profits); McCaskey, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *14
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating brokerage commissions should be deducted); Secs. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Rosenfeld, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing the
deduction of brokerage commissions); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Hughes, 917 F. Supp.
1080, 1086–87 (D.N.J. 1996) (approving of the disgorgement amount ordered without a
hearing); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Dilip Shah, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10347, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (discussing brokerage commissions).
225. See Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 531
F.3d 1339, 1345 (11th Cir. 2008) ("The equitable remedy of restitution does not take into
consideration the plaintiff’s losses, but only focuses on the defendant’s unjust enrichment.");
Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 77 n.10 (3d
Cir. 1993) (discussing the distinction between "profits" and "proceeds"); Commodities
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Avco Fin. Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12996, at *3–5
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (dissecting all revenues and costs associated with the defendant’s activity).
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Sulphur, as was its concern to avoid awarding a punitive remedy.226 Since
Texas Gulf Sulphur, the SEC in particular has tried to resist additional
counter-restitution for indirect or direct expenses with varying degrees of
success, but it has begun to admit that some direct expenses can be included
in counter-restitution.227 Disputes in measuring monetary remedies in
equity asserted by the SEC or the CFTC no longer dispute counterrestitution as a matter of law, only questions of fact about individual
categories. As a result, this Article will principally focus on the claims of
the FTC and the FDA.
Implied jurisdiction in equity has literally transformed FTC operations.
Once the FTC realized the advantages of such litigation over the normal
administrative law process, the FTC reduced its administrative law cases
and redirected those resources into federal litigation for injunctive and other
equitable remedies.228 The advantages of federal litigation are substantial.
Like the SEC and CFTC, the FTC has become an expert plaintiff or
prosecutor in a litigation process that is foreign to many lawyers. The
injunctive relief is not new, but the monetary remedies in equity are foreign
to many defendants’ lawyers and even jurists. The confusing vocabulary
and obscure legal doctrine suggest a long learning curve and the
opportunity for experienced "prosecutors" to "push" defense counsel and
the bench.
The FTC has filed an average of eighty to ninety cases per year for the
last ten years or more.229 The range of annual total awards of unjust
enrichment has ranged from $300 million to $900 million per year.230 On
the basis of a survey of cases from January 2007 to October 1, 2010, it was
226. See Secs. Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307–09 (2d
Cir. 1971) (stating that the SEC can seek remedial relief other than an injunction so long as it
is not a penalty assessment).
227. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. McCaskey, No. 98-CV-6153, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4915, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (confirming that courts can deduct from disgorgement
direct transaction costs such as brokerage commissions).
228. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Office of the Gen. Counsel, A Brief Overview of the
Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority (2002),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm ("The courts have uniformly accepted
the Commission’s construction of Section 13(b), with the result that most consumer
protection enforcement is now conducted directly in court under Section 13(b), rather than
by means of administrative adjudication.").
229. See, e.g., Roach, supra note 17, at 544 ("[F]ederal agencies have filed a growing
number of claims for large amount of unjust enrichment. For example, in 2003, the FTC
filed about 90 claims . . . .").
230. See id. (stating that in 2003, the FTC won in award and in settlement
approximately $900 million).
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determined that more than ten FTC lawyers had filed more than ten cases
during that period, and that more than twenty had worked on more than
five. Over that same time period, the average defense counsel has worked
on less than two cases. The data in that period also suggest that the FTC
practices venue shopping as it is a frequent filer in the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits. These two federal circuits account for about 55% of dollar
awards. Few cases are filed in the Second or Fifth Circuits.231
While the award per case is an impressive $4 million to $10 million,
the distribution of cases is skewed in terms of size. The top seven or eight
cases generally account for more than 80% of the total annual amount. The
annual average size of the remaining cases is generally less than $1 million.
Settled or stipulated verdicts are very common and the rate of injunctive
relief appears high. From anecdotal notes in FTC reports it appears that
defendants to FTC settlements and awards are often financially unable to
fund the monetary award and must seek reductions from the FTC or
bankruptcy protection.232 Personal liability for the principals is frequently
in dispute. The mass action aspects of FTC litigation discourage rescission
or counter-restitution in kind. It would be reasonable to surmise that a
defendant might readily settle for an injunction and a moderate monetary
award rather than face the prospect of defending a claim for a large claim
for gross disgorgement in a district court that has previously agreed to
follow the FTC’s aggressive theory of monetary damages in equity.233
Federal Trade Commission v. Stefanchik234 is a somewhat extreme
example of how a remedy is measured and defined for the FTC. John
Stefanchik and his corporation, Beringer Corporation, originated the
"Stefanchik Program," as explained in a book and supporting materials,
which prescribed methods for novices to achieve substantial wealth by

231. This assertion is based on recent research conducted by author based on PACER
data. For prior research on FTC venue shopping, see Roach, supra note 110, at 117.
232. See Federal Trade Commission Annual Report, April 2010, 55–63 (2010),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/04/2010ChairmansReport.pdf (summarizing order
enforcement, bankruptcy collections, and supporting criminal prosecutions).
233. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th
Cir. 2005) ("According to the court, the FTC made ‘exorbitant and unsupported settlement
demands’ based on false claims it could prove damages against Haroldsen in the amount of
$150 million through the testimony of hundreds of injured consumers prepared to testify as
to defendants’ deceptive acts and practices.").
234. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 932 (9th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that the district court did not err in holding defendants liable for the total
amount of loss incurred by consumers).
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buying and selling private mortgages.235 Stefanchik and Beringer received
a royalty of 15% to 22% of the revenues of an independent marketing
agent, Atlas Marketing, Inc., which promoted and sold the book as well as
marketed a sizable dollar amount of supporting services.236 There is no
indication in the Ninth Circuit opinion of any affiliation between Stefanchik
and Atlas or Justin Ely, who owned Atlas. The FTC reached settlements
with all defendants except Stefanchik and Beringer.
The district court entered a disgorgement order against Stefanchik in
the amount of Atlas’s revenues for the program.237 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the remedy with the following explanation that is startling in both
its breadth and depth of mischaracterizing remedies in equity:
We are unpersuaded by the defendants’ assertion that they should not be
liable for the full amount of Atlas’ sales because Atlas paid them only a
percentage as a royalty. Equity may require a defendant to restore his
victims to the status quo where the loss suffered is greater than the
defendant’s unjust enrichment. Moreover, because the FTC Act is
designed to protect consumers from economic injuries, courts have often
awarded the full amount lost by consumers rather than limiting damages
to a defendant’s profits. Stefanchik and Beringer were the driving force
behind the marketing scheme for the Stefanchik Program, with authority
to control its key components, and they benefitted significantly from the
sales induced by material misrepresentations.238

The Ninth Circuit has lost sight of the fact that its jurisdiction for
awarding remedies lies in implied jurisdiction to award ancillary remedies
to injunctive relief; its jurisdiction is not based on the entire FTC Act. The
Ninth Circuit’s alarming holding in Stefanchik does not represent a solitary
leap in logic or legal reasoning, but rather the next "logical" step in a body
of case opinions that are founded on fundamental error and weak research.
The case law has progressed to the point that the flaws and errors are not
apparent until the legal analyst has "drilled down" two or three levels of
case opinions. Given the high pressure environment that accompanies the
FTC tactics of motions for summary judgment, motions in limine,239 and
minimal standards for causation, it is understandable that inexperienced
235. Id. at 926.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 927.
238. Id. at 931–32; but see Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 67
(2d Cir. 2006) ("The appropriate measure of restitution is the benefit unjustly received by the
defendants. . . . [R]estitution is measured by the defendant’s gain.").
239. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, L.L.C., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3315, at *2–13 (D. Conn. 2006) (discussing motions to strike and affirmative defenses).
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defense counsel and many jurists fail to undertake the burden of proving in
detail where and how the FTC’s paradigm departs from traditional
understanding and violates accepted boundaries.240 In some cases,
definitions of key terms get so twisted that orders for gross disgorgement
are found to comply with the Grupo standard because the Second Circuit
held that equitable restitution applies and gross disgorgement is a form of
equitable restitution without considering how the FTC would measure
them.241 Such opinions are either unaware or neglect to mention that gross
disgorgement is only an acceptable award of restitution when the defendant
is found in contempt or the defendant fails to prove her claim for counterrestitution.242
The Stefanchik opinion demonstrates three of the key pillars to the
FTC’s ability to secure disgorgement orders that breach the traditional
boundaries for monetary remedies in equity and, therefore, exceed the
federal court’s jurisdiction. First, the Ninth Circuit and other courts are
invested in the belief that they have the authority to order consumer redress
or reimbursement, which is generally based on the prior Ninth Circuit
opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Figgie International, Inc.,243
which related to a claim under an alternative section of the FTC Act for
jurisdiction.244 Second, the Ninth Circuit believes that the FTC’s claims
allow for what Justice Scalia might call omnipotent authority to render
justice as required.245 Third, the Ninth Circuit and other circuits have held
that equitable remedies can be punitive or exemplary.246
While it is still unusual to see disgorgement awards in excess of the
defendant’s revenues, awards of the defendant’s revenues are common and
240. See supra notes 218–19, 222, 227 and accompanying text (discussing Tull and
McCaskey).
241. See Bronson Partners, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3315, at *12 ("Restitution and
disgorgement of profits are equitable in nature."); see also id. (holding that with respect to
restitution and disgorgement, "the court is not awarding damages to which plaintiff is legally
entitled but is exercising the chancellor’s discretion to prevent unjust enrichment").
242. The author is unaware of any agency case opinions that attempt to justify gross
disgorgement for a federal agency on the basis of the property law exceptions, as discussed
in Section VIII.
243. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Figgie Intern., Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 607–08 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding inter alia that the seller had liability for misrepresentations, and that part of
the district courts damages were punitive and therefore prohibited).
244. See id.
245. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982)
(stating that the court has broad equitable jurisdiction, which includes the ability to make a
freeze order).
246. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text (discussing Tull).
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also outside the court’s jurisdiction. The aberrant result in Stefanchik and
unfounded rationale cannot be brushed aside as a solitary outlier. In less
than two years, the opinion has been cited or quoted favorably in more than
eleven cases, including three cases outside of the Ninth Circuit.247
Therefore, it seems unlikely that Stefanchik will remain an extreme or
solitary FTC opinion for very long.
Since at least 1982, the FTC has asserted that its mandate from
Congress to fight consumer fraud expands a court’s jurisdiction to award
remedies in equity especially suited for the FTC’s mandate. Inferring this
special mandate from a provision that merely provides statutory jurisdiction
to seek injunctive relief is unwarranted, especially in comparison with
remedies awarded for agencies with similar implied statutory jurisdiction.
Such an inference would also run counter to the Supreme Court’s majority
opinion in Tull,248 which found that the EPA had overstepped its
jurisdiction in seeking penalties as an ancillary remedy to injunctive relief,
and Cavanagh,249 which held that a remedy awarded under implied
jurisdiction must meet the standard handed down in Grupo.
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Singer, however, can be read to be
compatible with the limitations set down by Tull and Grupo.250 But
Singer’s pronouncement has progressed and is now frequently repeated
without any reference to traditional restrictions on the court’s jurisdiction to

247. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Network Servs. Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d 1127, 1141 (9th
Cir. 2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. MacGregor, 360 Fed. Appx. 891, 893 (9th Cir. 2009);
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Trudeau, 579 F.3d 754, 771 (7th Cir. 2009); Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
INC21.com Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98944, at **55 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Dinamica Financiera LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88000, at *37 (C.D. Cal.
2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Swish Mktg., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47948, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Publishers Bus. Servs., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34336, at *44
(D. Nev. 2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Medlab, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1083 (N.D. Cal.
2009); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Home Assure, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32055, at *10
(M.D. Fla. 2009); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Med. Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 283,
310 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
248. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424–25 (1987) (arguing that a court in
equity may award monetary relief as an adjunct to injunctive relief, but it may not enforce
civil penalties by characterizing the legal claim as incidental to the equitable relief).
249. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 121 (2d Cir. 2006)
(stating that "federal courts possess authority under the Constitution and Judiciary Act to
impose equitable remedy of disgorgement").
250. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 1982)
(stating that the FTC’s objective is to obtain restitution "of moneys fraudulently obtained");
see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 973 (1982) (discussing the available equitable remedies).
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order remedies.251 The abbreviated caption from Singer has been cited or
quoted in more than twenty-five FTC cases since 1982.252
Relatively few in number, FDA opinions agree with the FTC’s view of
consumer redress. The FDA has secured the Sixth Circuit’s approval for
the proposition that statutory authority for injunctive relief includes
consumer redress, as that remedy complies with the overarching FDA

251. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Network Servs. Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d 1127, 1141 (9th
Cir. 2010) ("The FTC Act endows the district court with broad authority to ‘grant any
ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice,’ including the power to compel the
payment of restitution to injured consumers."); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d
924, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[B]ecause the FTC Act is designed to protect consumers from
economic injuries, courts have often awarded the full amount lost by consumers rather than
limiting damages to a defendant’s profits."); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d
1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994)) ("[T]he authority granted by Section 13(b) is not limited to the
power to issue an injunction; rather, it includes the ‘authority to grant any ancillary relief
necessary to accomplish complete justice.’ This power includes the power to order
restitution.") (citing Singer, 668 F.2d at 1113); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. RCA Credit Servs.,
LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73461, at **36–40 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing restitution
amounts paid by customers).
252. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Network Servs. Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d 1127, 1141 (9th Cir.
2010); Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 477 F.3d 668, 680 (9th Cir.
2007); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. MTK Mktg., 149 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 1998); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sec.
Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314 (8th Cir. 1991); Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 1989); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. World
Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1025 (7th Cir. 1988); Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1434 (11th Cir. 1984); Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
INC21.com Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98944, at **82 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 202, 212 (D. Mass. 2009); Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. J.K. Publs., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36885, at *14 (C.D. Cal. 2009);
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 285, 307–8 (D. Mass.
2008); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Med. Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 283, 323
(S.D.N.Y 2008); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Natural Solution, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60783, at *18 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Connelly, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98263, at *47 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 335 F. Supp. 2d
479, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Consumer Alliance, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17423, at *22 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Crescent Publ’g Grp., Inc.,
129 F. Supp. 2d 311, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Five-Star Auto Club,
Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 502, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Arlington Press, Inc.,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2055, at *25 (C.D. Cal. 1999); In re National Credit Mgmt. Group,
LLC, 21 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 n.3 (D.N.J. 1998); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Hang-Ups Art
Enters., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21444, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Silueta Distribs., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22254, at *23 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. ENGAGE-A-CAR SERVS., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16357, *6 (D.N.J. 1986);
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1280, 1281 (D. Minn. 1985);
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Int’l Diamond Corp./Full Serv. Import Brokers, Inc., 1983 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15504, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
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statutory scheme because "it serves goals of the FDC that are encompassed
within the section the FDA charges Appellants violated."253
The analysis of FTC gross disgorgement claims is complicated by the
fact that the FTC’s statutes include two key applicable provisions that have
been used to justify monetary remedies in equity. Section 13(b) of the FTC
Act provides the FTC with authority for injunctive relief,254 while Section
19 authorizes the FTC to make more specific remedial claims, including
claims based on damages to the victims or customers of the defendants.255
Peter Ward points out that claims under Section 13(b) are easier to make
than claims under Section 19 because Section 19 requires the FTC to
complete administrative proceedings before initiating civil litigation.256 Of
course, the result has been for the FTC to prefer litigation under Section
13(b) rather than a combination of administrative law and litigation under
Section 19. According to a statement on the FTC website, most of the
FTC’s consumer protection enforcement activities are now conducted in
litigation rather than administrative proceedings.257
Over time, the FTC has sought and been awarded monetary remedies
based on customer redress. The Ninth Circuit opinion in Figgie is often
cited in opinions that award customer redress under Section 13, although
generally without any specific acknowledgement that Figgie was based on
Section 19.258 The FTC is securing special remedies provided in Section 19
253. United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 763 (6th Cir. 1999).
254. See FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (2006) ("Upon properly showing a
temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted . . . .").
255. See id. § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (2006) ("Such relief may include, but shall not be
limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or return of property,
the payment of damages, and public notification respecting the rule violation or the unfair or
deceptive act or practice . . . .").
256. See Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade
Commission Act: Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1139,
1191–92 (1992).
257. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing the FTC’s 2010 annual
report).
258. Inexplicably, a number of opinions about the FTC’s claims under Section 13(b)
are justified in part by citing the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Federal Trade Commision v.
Figgie International, 994 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1993), which was a case based on jurisdiction
under Section 19. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Munoz, 17 Fed. App’x 624, 626–27 (9th Cir.
2001); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6192, at
*38 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 558, 564 n.6
(D. Md. 2005); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013,
1019 (N.D. Ind. 2000); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Commonwealth Mktg. Grp., Inc., 72 F. Supp.
2d 530, 544 (W.D. Pa. 1999); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cyberspace.com, L.L.C., 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25565, at *13 n.5 (W.D. Wash. 2002); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. 1263523 Ont.,
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but with the procedural ease of Section 13. At a minimum, the award of
consumer redress, based on compensating the plaintiffs’ losses, violates the
holdings in Grupo and Tull as outside of traditional remedies in equity and
as a punitive remedy, respectively. In addition, a recent opinion from the
Federal Circuit rejected such a practice in relation to the award of a
disgorgement remedy awarded under the Racketeer Influences and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) statute:
Congress’ intent when it drafted RICO’s remedies would be
circumvented by the Government’s broad reading of its § 1964(a)
remedies. The disgorgement requested here is similar in effect to the
relief mandated under the criminal forfeiture provision, § 1963(a),
without requiring the inconvenience of meeting the additional
procedural safeguards that attend criminal charges, including a five-year
statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 3282, notice requirements, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(l), and general criminal procedural protections including proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, on the Government’s view it can
collect sums paralleling—perhaps exactly—the damages available to
individual victims under § 1964(c).259

It would be impossible to definitively prove that the failure in court
opinions to acknowledge the distinction between Sections 13 and 19 had a
significant impact on the exact nature of the holding. According to my
count, in about half of the FTC cases that cite Figgie and that address
Section 13 of the FTC Act (twenty-nine out of fifty-three cases), Section 19
was not mentioned.260 Over time, the problem gets to be sheer numbers of
Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Under the FTC Act, the Court has the
power to ‘grant such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers’
resulting from deceptive acts or practices.’" (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Figgie Int’l,
Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605 (9th Cir. 1993))); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Think All Publ’g, LLC,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18623, at *6 (E.D. Tex. 2008).
259. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1200–01 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
260. Cases that cited Figgie without referring to Section 19 of the FTC Act include:
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2009); Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
Cyberspace.com, LLC, 453 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freecom
Commc’ns., Inc., 401 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2005); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Munoz, 17 Fed.
Appx. 624 (9th Cir. 2001); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Trudeau, 606 F.3d 382 (7th Cir. 2010);
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Dinamica Financiera LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88000 (C.D. Cal.
2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. RCA Credit Servs., LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73461
(M.D. Fl. 2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Trudeau, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37924 (N.D. Ill.
2010); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Conn. 2009);
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Home Assure, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32053 (M.D. Fla. 2009);
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. City West Advantage, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71608 (D. Nev.
2008); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Nat’l Urological Grp., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (N.D. Ga.
2008); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Natural Solution, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60783 (C.D.
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similar cases with a similar mistake and the fact that a reader of the third
generation of mistakes has no idea of the omission.
Recently, the Tenth Circuit overturned an award of sanctions against
the FTC, finding that the FTC claims were colorable and did not warrant
sanctions.261 As part of that opinion, the Tenth Circuit stated that the FTC
was free to seek consumer redress based on the following rationale:
Section 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), provides the remedy for a § 5
violation. Although § 13(b) does not expressly authorize a court to
grant consumer redress (i.e., refund, restitution, rescission, or other
equitable monetary relief), § 13(b)’s grant of authority to provide
injunctive relief carries with it the full range of equitable remedies,
including the power to grant consumer redress. In cases where the FTC
seeks injunctive relief, courts deem any monetary relief sought as
incidental to injunctive relief.262

Cal. 2007); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Emerald Worldwide Holdings, Inc.,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67947 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
White Pine Trust Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27218 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25173 (D. Wash. 2007); United States v.
Prochnow, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92895 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Connelly,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98263 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Voc. Guides, Inc.,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82308 (M.D. Tenn. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners,
LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3315 (D. Conn. 2006); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Peoples Credit
First, LLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38545 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (S.D. Fla. 2005), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, remanded by Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt.
Corp., 531 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2008); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. AmeriDebt, Inc., 373 F.
Supp. 2d 558 (D. Md. 2005); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accent Mktg., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12545 (D. Ala. 2002); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gill, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (C.D. Cal.
2001); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Para-Link Int’l, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21509 (M.D. Fla.
2000); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (N.D. Ind.
2000); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Five-Star Auto Club, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 502 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Solomon Trading Co., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19696 (D. Az.
1994); Samson v. Schmersey (In re Schmersey), 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 3089 (Bankr. Mont.
2005); Mishkin v. Ensminger (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.), 1998 Bankr. LEXIS
404 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998).
261. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1207–08
(10th Cir. 2005) (stating that the FTC could have reasonably concluded that facts might be
established to justify both injunctive relief and consumer redress and holding that the district
court abused its discretion by finding the allegations to be frivolous and groundless).
262. See id. at 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gem Merch.
Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468–69 (11th Cir. 1996); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Pantron I Corp., 33
F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745,
767 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating the three-part formula for calculating redress for consumer
injury); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373, 384 (D. Conn.
2009) ("Payments the defendants made to third parties are not allowable offsets as a matter
of law, nor are net profits the appropriate measure of restitution."); Fed. Trade Comm’n v.
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The Tenth Circuit overlooked its own opinion, issued one year earlier in
Callery v. United States Insurance Co.,263 that "though the issue is close, we
must adhere to the Supreme Court’s rather emphatic guidance and therefore
conclude that in a suit by a beneficiary against a fiduciary, the beneficiary
may not be awarded compensatory damages as ‘appropriate equitable
relief’ under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA."264
Despite an impressive list of precedents to the contrary,265 two circuit
opinions state that punitive remedies for FTC claims do not exceed a
court’s authority under Section 13(b).266 To be sure, punitive remedies
under Section 13 are not in violation of Section 19, but they are in violation
of Grupo and several other Supreme Court precedents. The Second Circuit
opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur, which is the foundation for most federal
agency claims under implied jurisdiction, clearly acknowledged this
limitation.267
Section 4 of the Third Restatement provides some frank
acknowledgments of the fact that terms like restitution, among others, have
been twisted and contorted to justify a remedy that a traditional court in
Nat’l Urological Group, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1215 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (arguing that
injunctive relief may be broader than the violations alleged so long as the relief is reasonably
related to the FTC Act violations that occurred); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Seismic Entm’t
Prods., 441 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (D.N.H. 2006) ("‘The appropriate measure for restitution is
the benefit unjustly received by the defendants.’ That amount need not be reduced to the
amount of a defendant’s profits from the illegal activities.") (citations omitted); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Atlantex Assocs., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10911, at *36–37 (S.D. Fla. 1987) ("It
is an appropriate remedy authorized by this Court’s equitable powers to require the
individual and corporate Defendants to pay consumer redress in the form of a cash refund
measured by amounts previously paid less any amounts returned to consumers . . . .").
263. See Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 401, 409 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding inter
alia that ERISA provision barred claim for payment of proceeds of life insurance policy
covering employee’s former husband, that the employee could not seek relief under ERISA
in the form of equitable estoppel, and that ERISA’s limitation did not foreclose all remedies
to employee).
264. Id.
265. See supra notes 118–22, 160 and accompanying text (discussing punitive
damages).
266. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 1997)
("Additionally, Febre and Ace argue that such disgorgement amounts to a penalty that
exceeds the authority of the court as provided by Section 13(b) of the Fed. Trade Comm’n.
They cite the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in [Figgie] in support of this assertion."); see also Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996).
267. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d
Cir. 1971) ("Thus we hold that the SEC may seek other than injunctive relief in order to
effectuate the purposes of the Act, so long as such relief is remedial relief and is not a
penalty assessment.").
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equity could not recognize.268 The misuse of terms, knowing or otherwise,
like "restitution" is part of the high art of rationalizing a remedy that stands
out in comparison to remedy measures for other federal agency or IP
claims. Whether the remedy is labeled as restitution,269 disgorgement,270
consumer redress,271 refund,272 or reimbursement,273 the remedy awarded
amounts to gross disgorgement. At most, the cases in this area recite that
disgorgement or restitution is an equitable remedy and fail to look beneath
the label.274 For example, the opinion in Federal Trade Commission v.
Febre275 is frequently cited to support gross disgorgement276 yet the holding
268. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. a
(2011) ("The chameleon-like qualities of the term ‘restitution’ permit its invocation in a
variety of circumstances where the legal and equitable nature of a given remedy may not be
apparent.").
269. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1021
(N.D. Ind. 2000) (referring to the damages awarded as "restitution").
270. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Medicor, L.L.C., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1058 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) ("Section 13(b) of the FTC Act permits the Court to order disgorgement
regardless of the amount of the defendant’s profits. The full amount lost by consumers is an
appropriate measure of damages." (citations omitted)).
271. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Atlantex Assocs., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10911, at
*36 (S.D. Fla. 1987) ("The court . . . finds that sufficient facts have been presented to
warrant granting relief for consumer redress which resulted from the defendants’ violations
of the Act.").
272. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Int’l Diamond Corp., 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15504, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (referring to the remedy for commercial redress as a "refund").
273. See United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 231 (3d Cir. 2005)
("[T]he restitution sought by the government here is reimbursement . . . .").
274. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 674 F. Supp. 2d 373, 378 (D.
Conn. 2009) (stating that in Verity "the Second Circuit assumed without deciding that
restitution is available as ancillary equitable relief under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act and
held that the availability of ancillary equitable relief under Section 13(b) derives from the
district court’s equitable jurisdiction").
275. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding inter
alia that the FTC could use defendant’s database data to calculate damages, which could be
awarded based on consumer losses rather than defendant’s profits, and disgorgement of
illegally obtained funds was justified).
276. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing
Febre and stating that "because the FTC Act is designed to protect consumers from
economic injuries, courts have often awarded the full amount lost by consumers rather than
limiting damages to a defendant’s profits"); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. INC21.com Corp., 745
F. Supp. 2d 975, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2010) ("The FTC Act was designed to protect consumers
from economic injuries. As such, courts have often awarded restitution in the full amount of
funds lost by consumers rather than limiting restitution solely to a defendant’s profits.");
Bronson Partners, 674 F. at 384 (citing Febre and stating that "the amount of actual profit
that the defendants may realize is not relevant, and if the defendants lose money engaging in
prohibited conduct there is no bar to restitution"); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Davison Assocs.,

COUNTER-RESTITUTION

1325

in Febre for the award of gross disgorgement is specifically justified on the
defendants’ failure to present significant evidence of counter-restitution.277
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit opinion in United
States v. Universal Management Services, Inc.278 also relies on profit
disgorgement cases to justify gross disgorgement. Note how the Sixth
Circuit avoids defining a punitive remedy and then resorts to sympathy for
the consumer:
Appellants also claim that restitution is punitive because, unlike
disgorgement which removes ill-gotten gain by forcing surrender of
profits, restitution requires a return of the entire purchase price, included
in which are costs and profits. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Blatt, 583 F.2d
1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The purpose of disgorgement is not to
compensate the victims of the fraud, but to deprive the wrongdoer of his
ill-gotten gain."). See also SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574
F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978). Simply because disgorgement and
restitution are different, however, does not make restitution punitive.
See SEC v. World Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 934 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[W]hile disgorgement has been
said to serve more important interests than the compensation of
investors, that principle is a far cry from the proposition that restitution
is an improper end." (internal citation omitted)). Appellants, who
disobeyed the law, should not have his expenses covered by consumers.
To say that restitution is unavailable is to say that consumers must cover
the costs of Appellants’ production, advertising, and illegal distribution.
Instead, the district court should have the discretion in a case such as
431 F. Supp. 2d 548, 560 (W.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Febre and stating that "the authority to
grant permanent injunction includes the authority to order any other ancillary equitable relief
necessary to effectuate the exercise of powers granted under [S]ection 13(b) [of the FTC
ACT]"); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Seismic Entm’t Prods., 441 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (D.N.H.
2006) ("The appropriate measure for restitution is the benefit unjustly received by the
defendants. That amount need not be reduced to the amount of defendant’s profits from
illegal activities.") (citations omitted); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Medicor, L.L.C., 217 F. Supp.
2d 1048, 1057–58 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Febre and stating that "Section 13(b) of the FTC
Act permits the Court to order disgorgement regardless of the amount of the defendant’s
profits. . . . The full amount lost by consumers is an appropriate measure of damages.");
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Five-Star Auto Club, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 502, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(citing Febre and stating that "the proper amount of relief is the full amount lost by
consumers").
277. See Febre, 128 F.3d at 536 ("[T]here was no abuse of discretion in awarding
$16,096,345 in damages where the amount was properly supported in the record and
defendants failed to dispute the facts in a timely and appropriate manner.").
278. See United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 764 (6th Cir.
1999) (holding inter alia that in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act precludes a court to sit in
equity from ordering restitution in appropriate cases and the order was appropriate in this
case).
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this to make the consumers whole rather than allow the illegal activities
to stand uncorrected to the consumer’s detriment.279

Each of the three cases cited within is briefly quoted to show that whoever
wrote the opinion should have been aware that he or she was justifying
oranges with apples. Furthermore, in at least two of the cited cases, the
opinion advised that disgorgement orders are not intended to compensate
the plaintiff or provide consumer redress. Apparently the Court must have
believed that it could order the disgorgement of profits or restitution of
revenues but not disgorgement of revenues.280
The FTC is not the only plaintiff that faces "outlaws." Some of the
defendants in these cases are bad actors: Not as bad as Bernie Madoff or
Blake, but serious fraud-feasors. For example, the product being marketed
in Universal Management was a treatment device for arthritis.281 The
patient was told to apply the device against her bare skin and pull the
trigger to administer a light shock.282 The devices were sold for $88.30 and
were totally ineffective. The defendant paid about $1 for each device as
they were surplus charcoal grill starters.283 On the other hand, there was an
equally bad actor who was the target of a disgorgement order for selling
defective prosthetic devices that broke easily after insertion.284 The latter
was a trademark case in which the defendant’s right to counter-restitution
was not in dispute.285

279. Universal Mgmt., 191 F.3d at 764–65.
280. See Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102
(2d Cir. 1978) ("Defendants complain that the court’s computation of profits and losses
ended on . . . the last trading day before the SEC suspended trading in BL securities; that
they still held substantial amounts of such securities at that time; and that losses after trading
was resumed wiped out any profits."); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335
(5th Cir. 1978) ("The court’s power to order disgorgement extends only to the amount with
interest by which the defendant profited from his wrongdoing. Any further sum would
constitute a penalty assessment."); Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. World Gambling Corp., 555 F.
Supp. 930, 935 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Under the circumstances
of this case, however, Norbay should not be required to disgorge any more than the profit it
made . . . .").
281. Universal Mgmt., 191 F.3d at 764.
282. Id. at 755.
283. Id.
284. See World Wide Prosthetic Supply, Inc. v. Mikulsky, 640 N.W.2d 764, 765–66
(Wis. 2002) (stating that although the business relationship ceased due to manufacturing
defects, the manufacturer continued to sell the prosthetic components without making
changes to their appearance or design).
285. See id. (providing the underlying facts of the case).
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The FTC does not limit its claims to fraud or misrepresentation. The
FTC’s mandate is so broad and its causation standard so low that it can
make claims for damaged consumers alleging negligence, an unintentional
tort.286 The remedies for these defendants are no different from the other
FTC cases. Consider a recent Ninth Circuit opinion relating to a failed
company that tried to provide a service for delivering checks by e-mail.287
The system did not work well and, in hindsight, it proved to be a target-rich
environment for third-party fraud.288 Third parties gained access to the
system and sent unauthorized checks on accounts registered on the
system.289 The e-mail service did not work and security was undoubtedly
weak, but there is no indication that the defendants were parties to the
fraud.290 The Ninth Circuit advises that neither deceptive intent nor
knowledge of the harm from a third party’s acts is required for a successful
FTC claim:
These cases illustrate that businesses can cause direct consumer harm as
contemplated by the FTC Act in a variety of ways. In assessing that
harm, we look of course to the deceptive nature of the practice, but the
absence of deceit is not dispositive. Nor is actual knowledge of the
harm a requirement under the Act. Courts have long held that
consumers are injured for purposes of the Act not solely through the
machinations of those with ill intentions, but also through the actions of
those whose practices facilitate, or contribute to, ill intentioned schemes
if the injury was a predictable consequence of those actions.291

286. See Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of
Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 676–77 (1977) ("[I]ssues of . . . causality relating to
whether consumers were influenced in purchasing decisions by the false claim are largely
avoided by the Commission rules that it need show only capacity to deceive rather than
actual deception, and capacity to affect purchasing decisions rather than actual effects.").
287. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2010)
(stating that the software allowed registered user to create and send checks by post or email);
see also id. at 1156 (discussing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Windward Mktg., Ltd., 1997 WL
33642380 (N.D. Ga. 1997), and stating that the court found defendant liable because it
"facilitated and provided substantial assistance to [a] . . . deceptive scheme," resulting in
substantial injury to consumers).
288. See id. at 1154 ("The . . . system was highly vulnerable to con artists and
fraudsters.").
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1159; see also id. at 1157 ("[Defendant] engaged in behavior that was, itself,
injurious to consumers. [Defendant’s] business practices might have served to assist others
in illicit or deceptive schemes, but the liability under the FTC Act that attaches to
[defendant] is not mediated by the actions of those third parties.").
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s
right to present evidence of counter-restitution:
Analogizing to securities law, the district court concluded that the
appropriate measure of equitable disgorgement was Neovi’s total
revenue. See SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1113
(9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that "the district court has broad equity
powers to order the disgorgement of ‘ill-gotten gains’ obtained through
the violation of federal securities laws") (internal citations omitted). An
evidentiary hearing was unnecessary because there were no "genuine
issues of material fact remaining in the case." [Defendant] argues that
this conclusion was error in that "the FTC did not put forth admissible
evidence demonstrating that Neovi realized $535,358 in ‘ill gotten
gains.’" The district court derived this specific figure from the gross
receipts on Neovi’s tax return, the details of which were not disputed.
[Defendant] argues that the figure is invalid because [defendant’s]
revenues were exceeded by developing, maintenance, and operating
costs for the software and website.292

The upshot of the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Neovi is that defendants are
being assessed disgorgement awards that are more severe than the remedies
provided in Section 51 of the Third Restatement even though many of these
defendants do not constitute willful infringers. The FTC does not have to
prove the defendant’s intent or even her knowledge of the harmful impact.
Under such circumstances, Section 51 would not justify even the
disgorgement of profits let alone the disgorgement of revenues.293
A case opinion in 2008 from the Eleventh Circuit provides mixed
indications of the ability of the federal circuit courts to resolve this problem
by themselves.294 The case is unusual because it directly acknowledges the
fact that claims for the CFTC and FTC are based on exactly the same
jurisdiction and rationale in Porter.295 Next, it held that the district court’s

292. Id. at 1159–60; see also id. at 1160 ("It is unclear what facts could be uncovered at
an evidentiary hearing that [defendant] did not have the opportunity to present to the district
court. In any case, as the FTC points out, the disputed points appear to be questions of law,
not of fact.").
293. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (2011)
(defining "conscious wrongdoer" and providing that conscious wrongdoers are liable for net
profits attributable to the underlying wrong).
294. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Wilshire Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 531 F.3d
1339, 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) (vacating the award of restitution and remanding this case to
reduce the amount of restitution granted for the defendant’s misrepresentation and affirming
the awarding of civil penalties and injunctive relief).
295. Id. at 1343–44.
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order for restitution in the amount of customer losses was outside its
equitable powers:
The equitable remedy of restitution does not take into consideration the
plaintiff’s losses, but only focuses on the defendant’s unjust
enrichment. . . . Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused
its discretion in awarding the full amount of customer losses. The
proper measurement is the amount that Appellants wrongfully gained by
their misrepresentations.296

However, two subsequent opinions from district courts in the Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged the opinion but rejected the defendants’ claim that
the Eleventh Circuit opinion precludes consumer redress. The U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida chose to interpret the Eleventh
Circuit opinion as similar to the Second Circuit opinion in Verity, which
rejected measuring a monetary remedy against a wholesaler as the retail
revenues, as opposed to the Ninth Circuit opinion in Stepanchik.297 It seems
difficult to misunderstand the Eleventh Circuit’s intent, although it would
have been helpful if that opinion had reversed the parts of its prior opinion
that endorsed punitive damages and awarded consumer redress.298 A
second district court opinion in Florida, however, avers that the opinion
does not "unambiguously demonstrate an intent to alter the available
equitable remedy in a statutory enforcement action."299
The ability of the FTC and FDA in particular to secure measures of
disgorgement that are significantly outside the mainstream of unjust
enrichment in equity is disquieting. This is especially true for decisions
that hold or imply that reimbursement or disgorgement of revenues or gross
proceeds is a remedy in equity that is appropriate, traditional, or both.
Equally disturbing is the ease with which federal courts ignore the
boundaries set by the Supreme Court on remedies in equity and the
authoritative discussion available in the Restatements.300
296. Id. (citations omitted); see also id. at 1345 ("The Third Circuit has concluded that
an award of restitution under § 13a-1 measured in the amount of customer losses is generally
improper.").
297. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. RCA Credit Servs., LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73461, at *37–40 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (discussing relief under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act).
298. See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466 (11th Cir.
1996).
299. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Home Assure, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32055, at
*11 n.9 (M.D. Fla. 2009); see also id. at *12 ("Additionally, an unmistakable (although
imperfect) resemblance exists between (i) consumer redress in the amount of gross revenues
and (ii) traditional money damages.").
300. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 (2002)
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Advocates for the federal courts might claim that the semantics of
restitution are confusing and difficult to master and that courts are easily
misled about how the terms should be applied. However, simple word
searches in electronic databases indicate that published FTC case opinions
make almost no mention of the First or Third Restatement.
Consider the following search results: (1) In the last twenty years the
Federal Trade Commission was named as a party in 869 federal cases and
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission was named in 655 federal
cases; (2) For the agency subgroups of 869 and 655 cases, the First or Third
Restatements were cited in only one case in each subgroup (by contrast, the
First or Third Restatements were cited in a total of 966 federal cases in the
last twenty years.); and (3) Dan Dobbs’ authoritative treatise on remedies
and Palmers treatise on restitution also had only one cite each for the
Federal Trade Commission subgroup.301 While the contrast in numbers is
stark, it may not justify the conclusion that the courts are willfully ignoring
the Supreme Court’s boundaries or the counsel of the Restatements.
However, it does suggest that the courts are disconnected and unwilling to
seek out persuasive authority on their own.
In the meantime, the FTC and FDA approach is being applied to a
wider area of the substantive law. A few cases outside of federal agency
litigation already cite agency cases on restitution.302 The FTC and FDA
also aim to apply their disgorgement remedies beyond fraud. The FTC has
announced plans to initiate disgorgement remedies in anti-trust cases,303 and
the FDA has already secured a number of huge settlements from

("Rarely will there be need for any more ‘antiquarian inquiry’ . . . than consulting, as we
have done, standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements,
which make the answer clear."); see also Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S.
356, 362 (2006) (discussing Knudson); Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance
Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318 (1999) (debating whether a preliminary injunction was
relied traditionally accorded by courts of equity).
301. The data were the result of an informal and somewhat unsophisticated case search
conducted on the LEXIS database. Agency subgroups were identified by searching for all
cases in which the agency was included as a named party.
302. So far, this happens only on rare occasions. See MJAC Consulting, Inc. v. Barrett,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49944, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 874
A.2d 919, 947–48 (Md. 2005) (citing an FTC case); Dixon v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11992, at *10 n.19 (E.D. La. 1998) (citing Febre).
303. See Stephen Calkins, Civil Monetary Remedies Available to Federal Antitrust
Enforcers, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 567, 569 (2006) (discussing the FTC’s use of Section 13(b) of
the FTC Act to obtain civil monetary antitrust remedies).
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pharmaceutical manufacturers by avoiding disgorgement claims based on
the manufacturer’s alleged failure to follow FDA production standards.304
X. Conclusion
Courts in equity, as well as the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment, have the potential to keep pace with massive changes in the
business and government environment for the purposes of offering
advantageous and even unique remedies to corporate litigation.
Technological change and the increasing importance of exotic forms of
intangible wealth will only make monetary remedies in equity more
relevant and applicable in the future. We are now prepared to respond to
any interloping doctor at our next bar convention!
The case law from the nineteenth century is useful because it provides
a snapshot of principles in equity before the federal government altered
them in IP legislation. As a comparison for agency remedies, it also
provides a useful reference for remedies awarded on the same basis of
implied jurisdiction. With some exceptions, the snapshot reveals that key
principles for the measure of monetary remedies in equity have not
significantly changed even though the rationale may have been mislaid.
Similar to many of the points raised by Professor Rounds’ article, this
Article provides examples of the influence of trust law on the law of
restitution and unjust enrichment.305 The rationale for some of the
applicable trust law warrants more attention, if only to improve our
understanding of the underlying rationale for parts of the law of restitution
and unjust enrichment and to state and define that law more accurately.
Identifying this connection would be integral to promoting greater
awareness of the commonality of monetary remedies in equity to many
areas of substantive law that otherwise may have been thought to be
independent.
304. See Eric M. Blumberg, Universal Management, Abbot, Wyeth, Schering-Plough,
and . . . : Restitution and Disgorgement Find Another Home at the Food and Drug
Administration, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 169, 170 (2003) (discussing the FDA’s plans to make
claims for restitution against defendants that offer unapproved products as well as seek
claims against established pharmaceutical companies for "significant violations of current
good manufacturing practice (CGMP) requirements"). According to this article, the FDA
has already secured significant results in substantial consent decrees (Abbott, $100 million;
Wyeth, $30 million; Schering-Plough, $500 million) for violation of CGMP. Id. at 170–71.
305. See, e.g., Rounds, supra note 36, at 336–51 (discussing trust law’s influence on IP
infringement mediation).

1332

68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271 (2011)

The defendant to a claim for unjust enrichment deserves an
opportunity to prove her counter-restitution. Such a due process right is
fully supported by existing case law and authoritative treatises. Aside from
limited property cases, gross disgorgement as a matter of law is relatively
rare and most of those cases can be explained public policy or equitable
discretion. Agency cases flout the proposed rule with seeming impunity at
least in the Ninth Circuit. Even when plaintiffs are entitled to gross
disgorgement as a matter of fact or based on the defendant’s default, almost
half of the courts provide for some form of counter-restitution.
The standard for measuring indemnity for a trustee in default,
assessing the benefit of the proposed counter-restitution, is already applied
in a significant portion of cases relating to willful defendants and appears to
be the modern standard for considering the services or labor of the
defendant. Combined with exceptions for infringing expenses and other
counter-restitution considered prejudicial to public policy, the benefit
standard is simpler to understand and could prove sufficiently flexible to
permit many of the fact patterns in the past that have demanded gross
disgorgement as a matter of fact.
The FTC’s mandate includes some reprehensible defendants. The
sympathy of a court is unmistakable when it justifies gross disgorgement as
a matter of law by asking why it would be fair or right for the court to allow
the defendant counter-restitution for business expenses when the plaintiff
was cheated.306 The short answer is that the court only has jurisdiction to
award equitable remedies—not remedies that necessarily seem "fair" or
"right." The long answer is that when counter-restitution is not necessarily
excluded, it is unlikely that very much counter-restitution will escape
elimination after discounting the plaintiff’s counter-restitution for the
benefit to the plaintiff and eliminating all expenses that offend public
policy. The FTC also has other choices: it can pursue the claim under
Section 19 or Congress can provide statutory authority for what is a remedy
at law. Punitive damage remedies awarded to government "prosecutors" in
a process that denies counter-restitution as a matter of law better resemble
remedies at law and therefore violate the spirit of the Seventh Amendment
to the U.S Constitution.

306. See Secs. Exch. Comm’n v. World Gambling Corp., 555 F. Supp. 930, 934
(S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 742 F.2d 1440 (2d Cir. 1983) ("In any event, however limited the SEC’s
prior use of disgorgement, it is a remedy that gives courts flexibility to adjust the punishment
for securities violations to fit the wrongful conduct and to accomplish Congress’
objectives.").
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This Article does not suggest that perfectly clear definitions or simple
statements of the law would prevent the current state of FTC case law. The
FTC does not seek simplicity or clarity and the courts neglect the source of
their jurisdiction and the need for third-party authority like the
Restatements. The FTC is currently pursuing Section 13 as a short-cut to
avoid the more burdensome alternative of Section 19. Absent a firm
reversal in the Supreme Court or legislative action in Congress, however,
the gross disgorgement agency cases may remain unchecked and thereby
add confusion and contradiction to a body of law that already has a
sufficient inventory of both.

